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 The purpose of this study is to test an adapted model of network theory against 
state air pollution control institutions.  Air pollution control presents a regulatory problem 
that has interstate, intrastate and multiple federal dimensions.  It is one of extreme 
complexity and uncertainty, from both a regulatory and scientific perspective.  The 
changing political environment federally has enabled states to redefine their roles in the 
regulatory process (Adler, 1997; Krane, 2007).   
 Drawing from network theory in intergovernmental policy processes my research 
tests three key factors in explaining state air pollution levels: tenure in office of the air 
policy administrator, the use of air policy boards, and networking encompassing agency 
 iv
 heads, air boards and the public. Theoretically this research builds upon important work 
by William Berry, Paul Teske, Lawrence O’Toole, Kenneth Meier and Mark Schneider in 
empirically investigating the network theory of policy behavior.  Network theory, as 
envisioned by O’Toole and Meier, provides for systematic empirical research on 
intergovernmental management.  This research expands the network model to incorporate 
citizen participation and information access in agency policy-making.  Further, this 
research develops the ozone exposure index as the dependent measure and metric of 
agency performance.  
The study limits itself to the time frame of 1999-2007.  This time-frame enables 
me to pool data on the instances of nonattainment of National Air Quality standards for 
ground-level ozone.   This study limits itself to ground-level ozone as the dependent 
measure.  Ground-level ozone is primarily regulated at the state level.  It and PM2.5 
represent the greatest threats to human health nationally. A series of panel data statistical 
models are tested revealing that the two-way generalized least squares random effects 
regression proves the best fit for the data.  Results support the hypothesis that the tenure 
of the air administrator positively impacts pollution reduction.  The number of citizen 
members on air policy boards is also found positively correlated to pollution reduction.   
This research contributes to the field by expanding the reach of the network 
model to air policy.  It also incorporates citizen participation into the model. Lastly, it 
also posits that institutional structure can be successfully tied to performance. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 This research seeks to empirically investigate the linkage between structural 
administration and performance outcomes in the context of air pollution control policy.  
Drawing from the network theory of public management and performance as devised by 
Lawrence O’Toole and Kenneth Meier (1991), I test the stability of the tenure of the air 
administrator, the presence of an air policy board, and the number of citizen members 
against the ozone exposure index where ground-level ozone exceeds the national standard 
as set forth in the Clean Air Act (CAA).   In the context of air quality administration the 
model is adapted to accommodate the insights of William Berry (1984) and Paul Teske 
(1991) to integrate questions of public accessibility and information sharing. 
This research potentially contributes to the field of public management and public 
administration in two key respects. Previously network theory has been utilized 
successfully in studying the dynamics of education administration.   This research seeks 
to apply network theory within the context of air pollution control.  Second, I expand the 
network model to incorporate citizen board members to integrate the role of the public in 
achieving agency ends.  Additionally, I create a measure of information access to further 
test the inclusion of the public in the policy process.    
Air Quality shares many of the same components that drive the study of education 
administration, such as a multi-tiered federal system with its vast web of information and 
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 power sharing networks.  Overall goals are often defined at the federal level, but states 
tend to be given wide latitude in achieving those goals and often further decentralize 
decision-making down to the local level.  Research often focuses on politics, interests and 
institutions at the federal level.  Yet the federal context also presents an opportunity to 
uncover a great diversity of approaches to administration across the states (Krane, 2007).  
This research is premised on two core assumptions.  There is insufficient research 
that incorporates state engagement in the regulatory policy process.  Second, a central 
focus on the state agency that does not incorporate citizen participation and engagement 
is equally incomplete.  Therefore, two important measures are incorporated in the 
network model.  The use of an air policy board is hypothesized to create an additional 
avenue for stakeholder and citizen participation in the policy process.   
Air boards with regulatory functions are surmised to present expanded 
opportunities for citizen engagement because state and federal sunshine laws, as well as 
requirements within the Clean Air Act, mandate open meetings and public comment 
periods.  It is therefore anticipated in this research that the presence of boards heightens 
opportunities for citizens to air their concerns publically at earlier stages of the policy 
process.  Further, the appointment of citizen members of the boards are anticipated to 
help to drive policy making toward furthering the public interest, in this case reducing air 
pollution. 
Citizen engagement is only possible if citizens are aware of the potential and 
avenues for participation.  Therefore our next measure of participation is access to 
detailed documentation via the air agency website on citizen participation.  The CAA 
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 mandates that the public has the right to public comment periods during the development 
of regulations and other key aspects of air policy development such as New Source 
Review (to be addressed further below with definition to be found in Appendix A.)  Yet, 
if they are unaware of this access such participation may be meaningless.  
Studying the variation between state institutions and correlating them to 
performance outcomes will potentially provide new insight into public management.   
This research seeks to present a viable performance measure: the ozone exposure index.  
This index accounts for number of days of exposure to ground-level ozone that exceeds 
the national air quality standard by the state population impacted.  Ground-level ozone 
pollution is chosen as a viable performance measure because it is not generally emitted 
from a direct “point” source such as a utility or industrial plant.  Vehicular emissions are 
key non-point sources of the precursors to ground-level ozone of oxides of nitrogen 
(NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs).  Although other precursor emissions do 
emanate from point sources, they may travel in the atmosphere hundreds of miles before 
chemically converting to ground-level ozone in the presence of sunshine. Ground-level 
ozone is largely a weather related phenomenon, with the highest incidence of excessive 
ground-level ozone in the summer months.   Many factors lay outside states direct control 
including cross border emissions, weather, and sunlight.  Still, the CAA mandates a 
reduction of ground-level ozone to protect human health.  States must find effective 
means for doing so and have been given wide latitude in determining those means.   
I apply an adaptation of network theory to discern whether the institutional 
structure of the air agency positively correlates to the reduction of pollution over time.  
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 This research aims to demonstrate that structure does matter, especially in relation to 
three key components:  the tenure of the air administrator, the presence of air policy 
boards, and the role of the citizen in the policy-making process via representation on the 
air board and through information access on the web.  
 The structure of this analysis is as follows: Chapter One will provide the 
introduction, definitions and the historical context of air regulation, beginning with the 
earliest attempts to control pollution to the present.  Chapter Two will provide the 
theoretical framework for policy innovation that informs this study.  Chapter Three will 
present the methodological foundation of the study, the hypotheses and the 
operationalization of all variables.  Chapter Four will constitute the data analysis and the 
conclusions drawn from the analysis.  Chapter Five will present the continuing challenges 
for policy innovation and options for future research. 
Context  
 
 The health threats posed by ground-level ozone are many and well documented.  
144.8 million Americans lived in counties in the U.S. with ground-level ozone 
concentrations above the national standard in 2007 (www.epa.gov/ airtrends/sixpoll.html, 
retrieved May 3, 2009). For humans lung function is of greatest concern.  Ground-level 
ozone causes reduced lung function characterized by wheezing, coughing and reduced 
inspiration capacity (Suh et al., 2000).  In sensitive populations ground-level ozone can 
cause a 10% reduction in pulmonary function (USEPA).  Serious clinical outcomes may 
include increased emergency room visits, chronic illness and possible death (Suh et al., 
2000).   Ambient ground-level ozone concentrations are shown to be related to increased 
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 hospital admissions for pneumonia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), 
asthma, and other respiratory ailments (Burnett al., 1994). 
 Air pollution, as with other environmental problems, often spans traditional 
boundaries, requires scientific diagnosis, and is costly to remedy (Hajer, 2003; John, 
1994; Rinquist, 1993).  The technical nature of environmental problems presents a 
specific challenge to democratic governance at all levels (Fiorino, 2001; Fischer, 1993).  
For instance in air quality, the specific environmental problem analyzed in this study, the 
average citizen is likely not cognizant of the potential threats to their person and as such 
does not avail him or herself to the means of recourse available to them by statute both 
state and federal.  Most pollutants do not come with distinctive smells or immediately 
experienced impacts.  Thus, unless citizens are properly informed of the dangers and 
these dangers are salient to their unique circumstances it is unlikely that they will alter 
their behavior to seek change. 
 This presents a complex problem for those seeking both to maximize public 
participation in governance (Box, 1998, Fischer, 1993) and those seeking technical 
solutions to remedy the effects of pollution.  How might government regulatory strategies 
be devised that both engage the citizenry and lead to efficient, just and reasonable means 
to reduce pollution without undermining the industrial base of the community? 
 Academic research on environmental issues aims at devising models of regulatory 
policy-making (Ringquist, 1993, Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1980), the economic success 
of Cap and Trade features of the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments (Burtraw and Palmer, 
2003; Ellerman, 2003; Goulder et al., 1997) and the increasing role of market based 
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 initiatives in reducing pollution (Eisner, 2007).  The locus of inquiry in these cases has 
generally been either political institutions or specific policies.  To date, the literature is 
largely silent at the micro level as to how state government bodies devise regulatory 
institutions to meet this critical need and whether they are effective in doing so.    
Elizabeth Haskell’s exploratory work on state environmental management is an 
important but dated exception (1973).  She presents cases studies of nine state 
environmental agencies.  Her in-depth exploration of agency structures in the nine states 
included analysis of boards present.  However, more recent work does not drill down to 
the board level in analyzing regulatory policy. For instance, a recent study on Clean Air 
Agencies (Potoski and Woods, 2000) focused on the interaction between agencies, 
politicians and interest groups. Because boards are often charged with implementing key 
provisions of the Clean Air Act (CAA) it is deemed critical to better understand their role 
in the regulatory process.  
Proponents of the network model of administration posit that the role of the 
primary administrator, in this case the air agency head, is of key importance to the 
organization.  Long serving administrators improve performance outcomes, because high 
performing administrators create and maintain information and policy networks 
necessary to achieve organizational aims.  High turnover would likely fragment such 
networks and delay or undermine important policy goals.   In O’Toole and Meier’s study 
of education test scores improved by at least five percent in cases where long serving 
administrators were present (2004).  In their view, administration is no longer a 
hierarchical as characterized by the standard organization chart.  Instead, today’s public 
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 management relies on cooperation spanning agencies and organizations, and often where 
no clear lines of authority exist.  The multi-tiered structure of air policy regulation offers 
an excellent opportunity to apply the network model outside of the education context.   
Further, the federal model also provides for nationwide regulation that targets 
point sources (the locus of emissions, often utilities, factories and other polluting sources 
that can be pinpointed).  The remaining non-stationary sources, vehicles for instance, are 
left to the states to regulate.  Also, pollutants that result from the derivation of secondary 
compounds from criteria pollutants, as in the case of ground-level ozone, are largely left 
to the purview of the states.  This also provides a key opportunity to apply the network 
model.  The pollution remaining after traditional regulatory tools are applied provide an 
opportunity to explore how networks operate at the state level to engage in pollution 
reduction efforts. 
This research seeks to fill this gap in the literature by investigating how states 
regulate air pollution.  Do long-serving air administrators have positive impacts on 
pollution reduction outcomes? Do states utilize Air Policy Boards to regulate air pollution 
in their state?  Are citizens given a seat at the table? Do states provide citizens with the 
information to engage in the policy process effectively and if so is there an impact on 
pollution reduction?  These questions will guide the study and adaptation of the network 
model of administration. 
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 Key Research Question 
1. Given the importance of reducing air pollution to protect public health does the 
institutional structure within state departments of environmental quality coupled 
with citizen participation and information access correlate to quantifiable 
differences in pollution reduction over time? 
Selection Criteria for Pollutant 
 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) presently has six main pollutants 
targeted under the Clean Air Act of 1970.  These pollutants are deemed the greatest 
threats to public health and are therefore labeled “criteria air pollutants.”  The 
Environmental Protection Agency is charged with setting the acceptable standards for 
these pollutants, known as National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS).  In the 
case of criteria air pollution the Clean Air Act of 1970 specifically requires that the 
reduction strategy be linked only to public health and that no consideration to economic 
costs be tied to the setting of the national ambient air standards.  Such performance 
measures are known as “primary standards.”   
Ground-level Ozone 
 
The focus of this study is ground level-ozone. Ground-level ozone is of particular 
interest because it is not directly emitted from a source and is the result of a chemical 
reaction of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) and oxides of nitrogen (NOx) in the 
presence of sunlight. While federal efforts of the EPA have had some success in reducing 
ground-level ozone, especially in regard to reducing NOx emissions, the states still play 
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 an important role in reducing ground-level ozone.  Therefore ground-level ozone 
provides an excellent target of study to discern the role of the state air administrator, the 
use of air boards and the degree to which citizens are engaged and provided opportunities 
to participate in pollution reduction strategies.  Ground-level ozone has two main 
precursors, Nitrogen oxides (NOx) and Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs).  Each will 
be described below. 
Nitrogen oxides (NOx) is a generic term for a group of highly reactive gases, all 
of which contain nitrogen and oxygen in varying amounts.  Many of the nitrogen oxides 
are both colorless and odorless.  However, one common pollutant, nitrogen dioxide 
(NO2) along with particles in the air can often be seen as a reddish-brown layer over 
many urban areas (EPA).  NOx is one of the key precursors to ground-level ozone.  
Figure 1. below demonstrates the sources of NOx emissions in the US.  On the road 
vehicles account for the highest incidence of emissions in the U.S.  
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 Figure 1.  National Nitrogen Oxides Emissions by Source Sector 
 
 
Source:  http://www.epa.gov/air/emissions/nox.htm#noxnat retrieved May 1, 2009 
 Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) represent the second precursor to ground-
level ozone.  VOCs are compounds that have a high vapor pressure and low water 
solubility. Many VOCs are human-made chemicals that are used and produced in the 
manufacture of paints, pharmaceuticals, and refrigerants. VOCs typically are industrial 
solvents, such as trichloroethylene; fuel oxygenates, such as methyl tert-butyl ether 
(MTBE), or byproducts produced by chlorination in water treatment, such as chloroform. 
VOCs are often components of petroleum fuels, hydraulic fluids, paint thinners, and dry 
cleaning agents(USGS, http://toxics.usgs.gov/definitions/vocs.html, retrieved May 4, 
2009).  Figure 2. below demonstrates the main sources of VOCs in the U.S.  As with 
NOx emissions, the primary source is on road vehicles. 
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 Figure 2.  National Volatile Organic Compounds Emissions by Source 
Sector, 2002 
 
Source:  http://www.epa.gov/air/emissions/voc.htm#noxnat retrieved May 1, 2009 
 
  Figure 3. below demonstrates the air quality guide for ground-level ozone.  The 
CAA mandates that states provide access to “AIRNOW,” a website that displays real-
time pollution levels nationally and locally on the state agency website.   AIRNOW is an 
interactive program that enables a citizen to view national maps of ground-level ozone 
trends, and to drill down to the state and city to determine the current status of air quality.  
In the investigative stages of this research I determined that all but one state provided a 
link to AIRNOW from either the front page of the umbrella agency website or from the 
main page of the air agency website. 
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 Figure 3. Air Quality Guide for Ground-level Ozone 
Air Quality Index Protect Your Health 
Good 
(0-50) 
No health impacts are expected when air quality is 
in this range. 
Moderate 
(51-100) 
Unusually sensitive people should consider limiting 
prolonged outdoor exertion. 
Unhealthy for 
Sensitive Groups 
(101-150) 
The following groups should limit prolonged 
outdoor exertion:  
 People with lung disease, such as asthma 
 Children and older adults 
 People who are active outdoors 
Unhealthy 
(15-200) 
The following groups should avoid prolonged 
outdoor exertion:  
 People with lung disease, such as asthma 
 Children and older adultsPeople who are 
active outdoors 
Everyone else should limit prolonged outdoor 
exertion. 
Very Unhealthy  
(201-300)  
The following groups should avoid all outdoor 
exertion:  
 People with lung disease, such as asthma 
 Children and older adults 
 People who are active outdoors 
Everyone else should limit outdoor exertion 
Source: ( http://www.airnow.gov/index.cfm?action=static.consumer, retrieved April 17, 
2009) 
  
 According to the EPA, one in three Americans is at heightened risk for the health 
consequences related to ground-level ozone (Air and Radiation, 2003, pg. 10).  
Participating in outdoor activities creates the greatest risk for ground-level ozone 
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 exposure.  Children are considered at the greatest risk.  They are the most likely group to 
spend their summers outdoors participating in vigorous activities.  Children are also more 
likely to suffer from asthma and other respiratory illnesses that are most likely to be 
aggravated by ground-level ozone exposure.  The next group in danger of ground-level 
ozone exposure includes all adults who are active outdoors.  This is due to the fact that 
physical activity causes ground-level ozone to more deeply penetrate lung tissue (Air and 
Radiation, 2003, pg 10).   
 Adults with asthma and other respiratory diseases are also considered to be at 
heightened risk for the effects of ground-level ozone exposure for the same reasons 
ground-level ozone is a danger to children.  For this group, even lower levels of ground-
level ozone may be unsafe.  Some otherwise healthy individuals are especially 
susceptible to the impacts of ground-level ozone and scientists still are uncertain as to 
why.  Ground-level ozone can inflame and damage the lining of the lungs.  If this damage 
occurs repeatedly over time lung tissue can be permanently scarred (Air and Radiation, 
2003, pg. 10). 
Ground-level ozone is one of the main constituents of smog.  Smog is often the 
dark haze found hanging over a city skyline.  Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) is a criteria air 
pollutant that is implicated in smog.  While ground-level ozone is unseen, smog is the 
charcoal haze often seen hanging over urban areas in the summer months.  Smog is the 
combination of ground-level ozone, particulate matter and secondary compounds, often 
that flow from chemical reactions of SO2 and NOx.  It is for this reason that the analysis 
below will often incorporate discussions of SO2, VOCs, and NOx.  Although there is 
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 some ambient air monitoring that detects the primary compounds of these two criteria air 
pollutants, it is now known that their secondary compounds pose the greatest health 
effects.  As smog is not directly measured, I will limit this analysis to ground-level ozone 
monitoring with the knowledge that the secondary compounds of SO2 and NOx are likely 
implicated in the development of ground-level ozone.   
The 1970 CAA amendments require each state to create a state implementation 
plan (SIP) for all criteria air pollutants.  The SIP details the emissions limits for all 
individual sources in order to achieve National Ambient Air Standards (NAAQS) 
statewide.  Emissions limits are geographic-specific and are therefore different given the 
conditions at each site.  The EPA creates regions within states based on modeling 
information to ensure that no particular area precipitously fails the prevailing standards. 
Conversely, select pristine areas with good air quality may be subject to Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration (PSD) requirements (generally set up to protect National Parks 
and other sites of national importance-signified by a Class One designation) that must 
exceed New Source Performance Standard (NSPS) limits set by the EPA in order to 
maintain the pristine air quality of Class One sites. 
Nitrogen Oxide (NOx) is also targeted under Title IV and is also a precursor to 
ground-level ozone.  In what has become known as the NOx-SIP call, the EPA has 
addressed the interstate transport of NOx.  It provided for cap-and-trade mechanisms like 
that of the acid rain program that resulted from the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments.  
States were required to present state implementation plans (SIPs) by 1999 and to begin 
further reductions of NOx by 2003.  Both the acid rain program and the NOx SIP call 
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 allow for flexibility in implementing the required reductions. Through Title IV of the 
CAA amendments of 1990 SO2 regulation has transformed to a market based approach in 
pollution credit trading.  Similar results are anticipated from the NOx SIP Call.  
However, all action has not shifted to the federal level. Non-stationary sources such as 
vehicles remain under the purview of the states.  States continue to be required to perform 
New Source Reviews (NSRs) for new facilities and for upgrades to current facilities.  The 
determination of when an upgrade ought to trigger an NSR has remained controversial 
from the earliest days of implementation (NAPA, 2003).  States also maintain reporting 
requirements, cross-over requirements to maintain National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS)-a program separate from Cap and Trade, and enforcement actions.   
  There remain key challenges for states to meaningfully reduce pollution.  Cross 
boundary pollution remains an issue, and questions on adequate monitoring and the 
appropriate levels of NAAQS standards remain. Many in the health and legal community 
remain uncertain that current standards are stringent enough (Coglianese and Marchant, 
2004).  Despite the innovative features of Cap and Trade it appears to be equally litigious 
to its older command and control counterparts.  This is demonstrated by a Supreme Court 
ruling in April 2007.  Grandfathering of older coal fired plants and differing levels of 
enforcement related to NSR suggest that not all states have the means or the wherewithal 
to use a network based approach to reduce air pollution problems in their state.  What are 
the impediments to progress?  Where progress has occurred can it be correlated to board 
structure and/or to the longevity in office of the air administrator?  Does the market-based 
innovation at the federal level induce innovation at the state level? 
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  Also, there are a number of control variables that must be accounted for in order 
to isolate the role of boards in relation to pollution outcomes.  The strength of utilities 
industries in each state in relation to state GDP, and the growth in the use of coal 
consumption over time in each state must be accounted for as well. The political context 
is hailed by many to be a contextual variable of importance (List and Mchone, 2000), but 
is downplayed by others (Ringquist, 1993, Potoski and Woods, 2003).  State economic 
trends are also hypothesized to be a factor (Becker, 2003); therefore I will track annual 
unemployment rates for the period of study.   
A Brief History of Air Regulation 
 
 Air is the quintessential “moving target” that creates pesky problems for public 
administrators at all levels.  Pollution cannot be contained within the arbitrary borders of 
states, nor are there reasonable means to designate a single entity with all policy 
responsibilities.  Thus, in the US context air policy is a complex web at the federal level 
engaging the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Energy, Federal 
Legislation and Congressional oversight to name but a few.  At the state level the picture 
is less clear.    
Early Action by US Cities 
 
 The first recorded attempts to regulate air quality in the United States were 
initiated by the cities of Chicago and Cincinnati in 1881 (EPA, 2000).   The impetus was 
to control both smoke and soot emanating from furnaces and locomotives.  At the time 
there was little hard scientific data on the health impacts of smoke and soot.  The 
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 perceived need arose from anecdotal evidence and the obvious visual evidence of black 
pluming clouds of smoke and the legion of black soot found in urban areas.  Other cities 
followed suit and began to pass their own laws by the early 1900s (see Table 1.)  
Evidence in these early days was characterized by a combination of coarse soot and dust 
fall with fine carbonaceous and acidic particles and gases from industrial and domestic 
sources (Bachman, 2007 pg. 655).  A medical and scientific consensus was emerging that 
the emissions were harmful to public health, but at the time no hard data was available 
(Bachman, 2007). 
Table 1.  Development of principal American municipal smoke abatement 
Legislation before 1930 
Decade        Cities 
1880–1890  Chicago, IL; Cincinnati, OH 
 
1890–1900  
St. Paul, MN; Cleveland, OH; Pittsburgh, PA 
 
1900–1910  
Los Angeles, CA; Minneapolis, MN; St. Louis, MO; 
Milwaukee, WI; Indianapolis, IN; Dayton, OH; 
Detroit, MI; Akron, OH; Buffalo, NY; Rochester, NY; 
Syracuse, NY; Washington, DC; Baltimore, MD; 
Philadelphia, PA; 
Newark, NJ; Springfield, MA; New York, NY; 
Boston, MA 
1910–1920 Portland, OR; Denver, CO; Kansas City, MO; Des 
Moines, IA; Duluth, MN; Nashville, TN; Birmingham, 
AL; 
Louisville, KY; Flint, MI; Toledo, OH; Atlanta, 
GA;Columbus, OH; Richmond, VA; Albany County, 
NY; Jersey City, NJ; Hartford, CT; Providence, RI; 
Lowell, MA 
1920–1930 San Francisco, CA; Seattle, WA; Salt Lake City, UT; 
Sioux City, IA; Omaha, NE; Cedar Rapids, IA; Grand 
Rapids, MI; Lansing, MI; East Cleveland, OH; 
Wheeling, WV; Erie County, NY; Harrisburg, PA 
Source:  Bachmann pg. 646 
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 Although there was some evidence of improvement in the various cities that had 
mandated reductions, World War I and the increase in industrial production that followed 
in many cases lead to an abandonment of legal enforcement of abatement and an increase 
in pollution (Bachman, 2007).  Health effects remained largely unknown. Targeted study 
was hampered by an inability to systematically monitor emissions and gaps in scientific 
knowledge.  For instance, in the early period very little was known about the formation of 
particulate matter that contributes to the creation of acid-rain.  This knowledge gap led 
some to believe that simply building taller emissions stacks would solve potential smoke 
and soot problems.  Although the EPA recognized that tall stacks and intermittent 
controls were insufficient to reduce secondary effects of SO2, these dual problems did not 
receive regulatory treatment until the Clean Air Amendments of 1990 (Bachmann, 2007, 
pg. 683), which will be explained further below.   
Health Effects of Air Pollution  
 
 In the early stages of industrial development the public understanding of the 
health risks of air pollution centered on smog events and corresponding deaths in urban 
areas.  There was a lack of air quality monitoring, or even general know-how on the 
potential of monitoring, that persisted in the US until late in the 20th century.  Health 
effects research was similarly slow to evolve.  The EPA notes that studies began to 
correlate pollution levels to hospital records to show that high incidences of pollution 
were correlated to health conditions such as asthma, bronchitis and other respiratory 
illnesses (EPA, 2006, pg 4-25). 
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  We now know that there are persistent and serious health impacts to children who 
live in highly polluted areas, including those considered “nonattainment areas” in the US.   
According to David Bates: 
 [a]ir pollutants have been documented to be associated with a wide 
variety of adverse health Impacts in children. These include increases in mortality 
in very severe episodes; an increased risk of perineonatal mortality in regions of 
higher pollution, and an increased general rate of mortality in children; increased 
acute respiratory disease morbidity; aggravation of asthma, as shown by increased 
hospital emergency visits or admissions as well as in longitudinal panel studies; 
Increased prevalence of respiratory symptoms in children, and infectious episodes 
of longer duration; lowered lung function in children when pollutants increase; 
lowered lung function in more polluted regions; increased sickness rates as 
indicated by kindergarten and school absences; the adverse effects of inhaled lead 
from automoble exhaust. These impacts are especially severe when high levels of 
outdoor pollution (usually from uncontrolled coal burning) are combined with 
high levels of indoor pollution. In developed countries, where indoor pollution 
levels are lower, increasing traffic density and elevated NO2 levels with secondary 
photochemical and fine particulate pollution appear to be the main contemporary 
problem. By virtue of physical activity out of doors when pollution levels may be 
high, children may experience higher exposures than adults. Air pollution is likely 
to have a greater impact on asthmatic children if they are without access to routine 
medical care. (Bates, 1995) 
 
It bears noting that Bates included three non-attainment regions from the United States in 
his data, therefore the above should not be construed to reflect third world problems or 
problems external to the United States.  Additionally, it is important to note that the 
contemporary problem of particulate matter in developed nations may be linked to the 
downwind chemical reaction of sulfur dioxide into particulate matter. 
Environmental Effects of Air Pollution 
 
 As the industrial revolution advanced it became clear that there were 
environmental costs associated with most sectors of the industrial machine (Kessel, 
2006).  Soot, smelters, and coal combustion with black smoke billowing from pipes are 
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 the supposed price of the advance of civilization.  Yet, at first, these issues were 
considered as aesthetic nuisances rather than through the lens of potential environmental 
degradation. It was widely assumed that pollutants released into the atmosphere would 
simply dissipate in the sky or otherwise disperse so as not to be a threat to human health.  
The high smokestacks of many polluting industries were considered innovations that 
helped to reduce pollution in urban areas.   Many years passed before it was recognized 
in the scientific community that the pollutants were capable of traveling many hundreds 
of miles only to mix with other pollutants to create other chemical compounds reflecting 
new threats to both public health and the environment (Ackerman and Hassler, 1980).  It 
is now suspected that the secondary compounds have more significant health and 
environmental impacts than the primary compounds of SO2, NOx and VOCs (EPA, 
2008). 
Acid Rain  
 
 A significant threat for our purposes is the mixing of SO2 , NOx and VOCs in the 
atmosphere with water, oxygen and oxidants.  This mix forms a solution of sulfuric acid 
and nitric acid known as acid rain and is implicated in the potential secondary impacts on 
the amount of aluminum and methylmercury in lakes and fish (Burtraw and Palmer, 
2003). Acid rain can do significant damage to crops, buildings and aquatic regions 
hundreds of miles from the site of the initial discharge of the pollutants (Schwartz, 1989). 
Acid rain is in some ways a misnomer because the compounds can fall to the earth in 
either wet or dry form.  The wet form includes rain, snow and fog.  The dry form falls to 
earth in either gaseous form or as dry particles.  These dry particles are blown by wind 
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 and settle on buildings, cars and vegetation.  The acidity can cause some of these items to 
be eaten away.  For instance many buildings of historic significance have shown 
significant external deterioration in areas were acid rain is a persistent problem 
(http://www.epa.gov/acidrain/effects/materials.html, retrieved May 3, 2009).   
 When the dry materials are washed away by rain they enter lakes and streams and 
cause acidification.  This can lead to fish die offs. Trees at high elevations have also 
shown significant damage.  Acid rain also impacts visibility.  The vistas at many national 
parks once beloved by Americans are now degraded at many important sites, including 
the Grand Canyon, the Smoky Mountains and along the Appalachian trail 
(http://www.epa.gov/acidrain/effects/visibility.html, retrieved May 3, 2009).  This is true 
despite the fact that these areas may be in compliance with NAAQS standards.  In a 
strange twist, the cleaner the air at the given location the more the visibility will be 
degraded by the presence of particulate matter. 
Ground-level Ozone 
 
 Ground-level ozone is an unseen threat to human health. Unlike its counterpart 
smog, it is has no distinct odor or visual impact 
(http://www2.nsc.org/library/facts/ozone.htm, retrieved May 3, 2009).  While 
stratospheric ozone is critical to maintain life on the planet, ground-level ozone is a 
stealth threat to human health and the health of vegetation.  The EPA estimates that crop 
damage creates a $500 million loss annually to farmers. Ground-level ozone has no 
primary source; it cannot be traced to a utility stack or industrial emitter. Neither can it be 
traced to a car’s exhaust pipe.  However, all of these sources emit other chemical 
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 components that travel through the atmosphere until conditions are ripe to chemically 
react into secondary compounds that then lead to the production of ground-level ozone.   
 As noted above, there are widespread health effects across a number of at risk 
populations.  The EPA notes the following health impacts on their website: 
 airway irritation, coughing, and pain when taking a deep breath;  
 wheezing and breathing difficulties during exercise or outdoor activities; 
 inflammation, which is much like a sunburn on the skin;   
 aggravation of asthma and increased susceptibility to respiratory illnesses like 
pneumonia and bronchitis; and, 
 permanent lung damage with repeated exposures. 
(http://www.epa.gov/air/ozonepollution/health.html, retrieved May 3, 2009). 
Further, the EPA notes these effects may lead to increased school absences, medical 
visits to both to doctors and emergency rooms, as well as hospital admissions.  According 
to the EPA research also indicates that ground-level ozone exposure may increase the risk 
of premature death from heart or lung disease. 
(http://www.epa.gov/air/ozonepollution/health.html, retrieved April 19, 2009). 
 The CAA amendments of 1970 included ground-level ozone as a criteria air 
pollutant.  In 1971 the EPA established a 1-hour National Ambient Air Quality (NAAQS) 
of 0.08 ppm.  This standard was revised in 1979, 1997 and new standards were in the 
review process during the period of this study.  A comprehensive history of ground-level 
ozone standards is set forth below in Table 2. 
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 Table 2.  History of Ground-level Ozone Standards 
 
1971  EPA established a 1-hour NAAQS ground-level ozone standard of 0.08 ppm. 
1979 EPA revised the 1-hour standard to 0.12 ppm. 
The number of counties designated for non-attainment reached 371. 1991 
Concerned about the new science indicating adverse effects at levels allowed by that 
NAAQS, the American Lung Association went to court to compel EPA to act. 
1994 EPA obtained a voluntary remand based on a promise to consider the newer studies. 
1995 EPA and 37 eastern states form the Ozone Transport Assessment Group -  work with 
stakeholders to study ground-level ozone transport for two years. 
1996 EPA issued a three-volume criteria document encompassing hundreds of new 
scientific studies, finding “strong” scientific evidence of adverse health effects from 
ground-level ozone at levels allowed by the 1979 NAAQS. 
(July) EPA revised the air quality standards for ground-level ozone replacing the 
1979 standard with an 8-hour standard set at 0.08 ppm. Three states and dozens of 
industry plaintiffs quickly challenged the new standards. 
1997 
(October) EPA acted on the work of the Ozone Transport Assessment Group and 
proposes NOx regional reductions in the eastern US. 
1998 EPA issued the final rule on regional NOx reductions, known as the NOx SIP Call. 
1999 The DC Circuit Court of Appeals sent the 1997 standards back to EPA for further 
study. EPA appealed. 
2001 The U.S. Supreme Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the Clean Air 
Act as EPA had interpreted it in setting the 1997 health-protective air quality 
standards. The Supreme Court also reaffirmed EPA’s long-standing interpretation 
that it must set these standards based solely on public health considerations without 
consideration of costs. 
2002 EPA began the process by which states (governors) and tribes submit 
recommendations for what areas would be designated non-attainment (failing to 
meet the 1997 standard). 
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  Table 2. Continued. 
 
(June) EPA proposed the clean air ground-level ozone implementation rule with 
options for how areas would transition from the 1-hour ground-level ozone 
standard to the 8-hour ground-level ozone standard. 
(July) States and tribes recommended designations - 412 counties were included. 
(December) EPA responded to states and tribes describing intended modifications 
to their recommended designations - 506 counties were included. 
2003 
(December) EPA proposed the Clean Air Interstate Rule to help areas in the US 
meet the 8-hour ground-level ozone standard. 
2004 (April 15) EPA finalized the Clean Air ground-level ozone designations and basic 
implementation rule. 
(June) State plans for meeting the 1997 health-based 8-hour ground-level ozone 
standard were submitted to EPA. 
2007 
(July) EPA proposed revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS) for ground-level ozone. 
Source:  EPA http://www.epa.gov/air/ozonepollution/history.html, retrieved April 7, 
2009 
 
Early State Activity leading to Federal Involvement to reduce Air Pollution 
 
Oregon became the first state to pass comprehensive statewide legislation in 1952 
that included the creation of a state air pollution agency (Rinquist, pg 45 citing the EPA).  
Other states soon followed with legislation primarily aimed at curbing smoke and 
particulate matter.  However, cities remained the key enforcers of air quality standards set 
by law in their locality, and most states had no institutional structure dedicated to air 
pollution control at this time. 
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  The Federal government first stepped in and passed the Air Pollution Control Act 
in 1955 with the general aim of providing funding assistance to the states for research and 
training efforts.  Public awareness of the potential threats to pollution remained low and 
states did little to combat the rise in pollution.  The Federal government enhanced its role 
and began centralizing its power over air pollution with the Clean Air Act of 1963.  The 
Act provided permanent funding streams for air pollution research, and federal assistance 
to states in creating air pollution agencies.  Additionally, the Act provided assistance in 
resolving cross-boundary air pollution problems.  Implementation of the Act was 
hampered by the requirement that states request assistance to trigger federal action.  As of 
1967 there were no requests for intrastate enforcement and only three for interstate 
enforcement (Bachmann, 2007, pg. 662).   
 Rachel Carson’s ground breaking work Silent Spring, published in 1962, is 
credited with energizing a previously lethargic public on environmental issues.  In the 
book, Carson eloquently explained bird and fish kills relating to pesticide use, speaking 
of the silence left in the wake of the bird kills.  Her book galvanized the public, which 
until that time had seen mostly positive publicity relating to DDT, one of the main 
chemicals she railed against.  It immediately became a best seller and by years end over 
40 bills were introduced in state legislatures to regulate the application of pesticides 
(Hynes, 1989).   
  Air quality was increasingly shown to be a concern in polling results during the 
sixties. President Nixon recognized the opportunity to capture public sentiment.  His 
administration crafted a 37 point environmental platform, making the environment the 
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 centerpiece of his state of the union address in 1970, the same year as the first Earth Day 
celebration.   
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 
 
 An early proposal achieved was the creation of the EPA.  Numerous proposals 
also recognized that the CAA of 1963 had fatal flaws and revisions were needed.  In what 
Bachmann deems as a “race to the top”  following the success of Silent Spring, Earth Day 
and other works such as Ralph Nader’s Vanishing Air, legislators in Washington were 
favorable to sweeping amendments to the CAA.  The Amendments were signed into law 
when the fledgling EPA was only four weeks old. 
Key provisions of the 1970 Amendments: 
 The creation of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) 
for six criteria pollutants deemed to have substantial health risks 
for the general pollution.  These include CO, Pb, NO2, O3, 
particulate matter, and SO2. 
 The EPA is required to establish source specific emissions (NSPS) 
limits for both stationary and mobile sources to meet emissions 
limits imposed by NAAQS. 
 States are authorized to issue emissions permits to new facilities 
and to enforce the requirements of the act. 
 Stricter requirements are established for HAPs and for new 
facilities. 
 Provide additional funding for continued research and for 
professionalization and staff development of state agencies. 
 Sources located in attainment areas may fact Prevention of 
Significant Deterioration (PSD) requirement to insure they do not 
slip into non-attainment. 
 Sources located near a national park or other pristine area may also 
be required to meet additional limits such as those aimed at 
preserving visibility (Ellerman, 2003, pg 3) 
 Areas designated in nonattainment are required to inventory their 
emissions and are subject to increasingly stringent control 
measures depending the level of severity.  
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Although the amendments had broader scope and signaled a more comprehensive 
commitment to pollution reduction, they suffered from a number of defects.  First, many 
of the targets were overly ambitious, especially in regard to vehicle emissions.  It 
imposed major duties on states when cities to that point had been the key actors in 
drafting and enforcing pollution reduction strategies.  Thus the short time frames and 
scope of duties imposed hardships on the states that were resented at the state agencies 
(where they existed).  State administrators largely perceived that budget allocations did 
not match new federal mandates.   
Under the NSPS guidelines for SO2 issued in 1971 as a result of the CAA 
amendments of 1970 new facilities that intended to burn high sulfur coals would be 
forced to purchase “wet scrubbers.”  Scrubbers are nicknamed as such because they 
would use a limestone solution to “scrub” flu gases clean prior to emitting in order to 
drain off sulfur dioxide- a process that results in toxic sludge that would require disposal.  
These scrubbers represented the best available control technology (BACT) for high sulfur 
coal when the EPA mandated NSPS for SO2 in 1971 (set as a condition of the 1970 CAA 
amendments) in spite of the fact that only three were in operation at the time.  Utilities 
were skeptical about the reliability of the scrubbers and balked at their expense.  It is 
noteworthy that the process was known to dispose of 70% of the sulfur dioxide only, 
leaving behind other criteria pollutants such as NOx.  It was estimated that the annual 
cost would add at least 2% to consumer utility bills and cost utilities an estimated 35 
billion dollars to install.  The resulting wet sludge also created a new set of challenges for 
hazardous waste disposal. 
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 Although an emissions ceiling was dictated for stationary sources, no percent 
reduction was specified.  This meant that new plants could receive permits with 
emissions targets without requiring the facility to use any pollution control technologies 
whatsoever if planners intended to use low sulfur coal rather than high sulfur coal.  This 
is a key issue for environmentalists because scenic impacts may be felt when criteria 
pollutants fall well below primary standards.  New facilities could avoid the “burden” of 
adding control technologies by planning to use low sulfur coal found predominantly in 
the west rather than high sulfur coals found in the Midwest and Eastern states.  Thus a 
competitive disadvantage resulted in heightening the relative value of low sulfur coal and 
had a demonstrable impact on employment levels in high sulfur coal regions.   
The NSPS also differed from NAAQS standard setting in that the emissions limit 
is technology-based and is not mandated to consider only public health concerns.  Rather, 
the EPA is directed to ensure that all new sources employ the best available pollution 
controls technology (BACT) to both minimize emissions without undermining the 
opportunity for economic growth (Haskell, 1982).  This history amply demonstrates that 
NSPS was not fulfilling its intended purpose to avoid economic dislocations or create 
competitive advantages in regions where low sulfur coal was predominant.  
In 1973 the Sierra Club in concert with the Navaho nation filed suit against the 
EPA demanding a uniform standard for SO2 reduction.  This was due to the reduced 
visibility in the four corners region of the Southwest due to a new power plant there that 
was built with no control technology.  Although the suit was dismissed because the 
complainants had not exhausted their administrative remedies, it signaled that 
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 environmentalists had coalesced around scrubbing technology as a reasonable means to 
impose a uniform national standard.  In  1976 the Sierra Club petitioned the EPA to 
revise the NSPS on the grounds that air pollution control technology had improved so 
that 90% improvement was both possible and required (Haskell, 1982, pg 11, EPA docket 
information omitted). 
In 1977, Congress passed amendments that required both the emissions ceiling 
and a percent reduction, meaning that a NSPS for fossil-fuel fired power plants include 
both an emission limit and a requirement to reduce a specified percentage of pollution 
from fuel burned.  This meant that if a high percentage requirement were promulgated all 
plants would require scrubbers.  The focus was now on the EPA and its rule making 
process as it drafted the new NSPS standards.  The stated intent of the revised NSPS was 
to balance the challenges posed by industry, environmentalists and those concerned with 
regional economic dislocations.  While this proved a difficult goal, industry got the 
variable emissions targets they sought, environmentalists got required percent reductions 
that meant all new plants would have some form of pollution control technology built-in, 
and language was included that espouses a preference for local fuel sources to address the 
economic dislocations caused by the reduction in use of high sulfur coal.  However, these 
changes continued to apply to new sources only leaving some of the heaviest polluters 
beyond the reach of state and federal regulators.  It is clear from the text of the Clean Air 
Act that the grandfathered plants were not intended to maintain a long-term right to emit 
higher levels of pollution than their newer counterparts.  The legislative intent assumed 
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 that the plants would either be phased out or that a NSR would be triggered when large 
scale alterations occurred at the plants. 
From 1975 to 1990 the United States was only able to reduce SO2 emissions by 
18% (Bachmann, 2007, pg 683).  The longevity of the most polluting coal fired plants is 
believed to have largely contributed to the less than admirable reductions, especially 
given evidence that ambient monitoring does not adequately capture emissions.  Thus 
these percentages are based on modeling activity and may or may not adequately 
represent true emissions. 
New amendments in 1990 created the first of a long awaited market-based 
approach to pollution reduction with the implementation of the SO2 “cap and trade” 
program under Title IV of the amendments.  Industry is allotted a fixed number of total 
allowances (2.25 million tons) comparable to the emissions rate of 1980 and firms are 
required to surrender one allowance for each ton it emits annually.  Unused allowances 
may be sold or banked for future use.  The great innovation of the cap and trade system is 
that only the end result was specified:  a specific tonnage allotment based on prior 
emissions patterns for each facility with clear and concise consequences for those who 
exceeded the limits.  Unspecified were the means to be used to meet the reductions. 
Unlike former efforts at what is commonly termed command-and-control regulation, 
detailed instructions down to technological specifications for cleaner technologies were 
not mandated.  This created an opportunity for both the utilities and 
supporting/complementary industries to seek to innovate.  This strategy has led to 
retooling of internal processes, the transition from high sulfur to lower sulfur coal mixes, 
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 and rail innovation all of which has contributed to pollution reduction (Burtraw and 
Palmer, 2003).       
The downside of the cap and trade strategy as of the 1990 amendments is that it 
applies to SO2 only and given that multiple criteria pollutants (including NOx) are being 
discharged from the same stacks it disincentivizes innovation that will achieve greater 
reductions across pollutants.    Its implementation reflects the political recognition that 
the grandfathering of heavily polluting older plants was allowed to fester for too long a 
period to the detriment of air quality and public health.  Title IV finally begins to bridge 
that gap by requiring emissions limits.   
Additionally, the problem with tall stacks simply dispatching its polluting 
contents downwind (and hopefully out-of-state in classic tragedy of the commons 
fashion) would be tackled with the 50% reduction in the aggregate level of emissions.  
This clause was believed to reduce the amount of acid rain deposition in the Northeast 
and also contribute to the reduction in fine particulate matter.  Finally, it was believed to 
close the gap on emission requirements imposed on old and existing sources (Ellerman, 
2003.) 
The NOx SIP call was the EPA’s solution to the downside of the Acid Rain 
Program’s exclusive emphasis on SO2.  The program targets 21 Eastern states with cross 
boundary pollution problems and requires an emission trading program in NOx 
formulated along the lines of the Acid Rain Program.  This means that states are provided 
some leeway in devising their reduction strategies, although it is required that they 
achieve a 60% reduction for large industrial boilers and turbines, a 90% reduction from 
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 stationary combustion engines and a 30% reduction from cement kilns.  These reductions 
are required during harmful summer months.  No targets were placed based on vehicular 
emissions, despite the fact that such emissions represent the highest percent of annual 
NOx emissions (as shown in the introduction on pg 15). 
This Chapter has provided an overview of the health threats relating to ground-
level ozone, smog and acid rain. Additionally, it has reviewed the legislative and 
regulatory history relating to ground-level ozone.  Lastly, it demonstrates that scholars 
know far more about what has happened at the federal level across the various criteria air 
pollutants of interest.  Further, scholars know very little about the state’s activity devising 
institutional structures to best reduce air pollution within their borders. This study seeks 
to determine if institutional characteristics contribute to pollution reduction outcomes. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Literature Review 
 
 
 This chapter will present a review of the key literature that informs this analysis.  
I will begin by discussing the network theory of administration. Next, I will discuss 
public accessibility and information access.  I will then broaden the discussion to themes 
within network theory beginning with the transforming role of federalism.  I will then 
explore policy literature that disavows the earlier assumptions that agencies or boards are 
often “captured” by those they regulate to the detriment of the public good.  In conclusion 
I will explore all known empirical studies of pollution reduction at the state level for 
clues to guide us in the present study. 
 The literature review is presented to provide a broad overview of network theory 
of administration, the importance of state institutions, and the role of citizen participation 
and information access in the regulatory process.   It will serve to demonstrate that states 
have an ongoing and critical role to play in pollution reduction as a key player in the 
federal structure.   
Toward a Network Theory of Administration 
 
 Laurence O’Toole Jr. and Kenneth Meier explore intergovernmental management 
as they develop their network theory of administration under the guise of studying school 
boards.  They foresee the management of public institutions to be of central interest to 
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 researchers of the twenty-first century (2004, pg 470).  This is due to the relevance of 
intergovernmental networks and the necessity to navigate uncharted waters where 
hierarchical organization charts with clear power relationships no longer exist.  The fluid 
interchanges that arise from this new context require empirical investigation into the new 
institutions and their managerial networks. 
 Although not specifically advocating the network theory of administration, 
William Berry does foreshadow many of its key attributes in challenging the capture 
theory in regard to utility deregulation.  Paul Teske also contributes to this discussion 
although again, not explicitly embracing the network theory of administration.  Their 
joint contributions to the ensuing development of network theory will be addressed in the 
context of these three analytic structures. 
Managerial Stability 
  
 Managerial stability is seen to have a critical role in the management of 
managerial networks.  A key factor is the administrator’s stability in office (O’Toole and 
Meier, 2002, 2003).  High turnover for administrators likely fragments the managerial 
networks developed by prior administrators.  Strong administrators are found to have a 
positive impact on performance.  Where test scores are the dependent measures of 
performance, O’Toole and Meier found a 5% increase in test scores due to the stability of 
the state superintendent for education (2003). 
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 Public Accessibility 
 Research has shown that public participation affects the nature of outcomes 
(Sabatier, 1987; Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1980; Schneider et al., 2003; Berry, 1984).  
Berry, for example, found that the public’s participatory role in the regulatory process 
affects the nature of policy outcomes (1984).  He finds direct evidence that the presence 
of the public at meetings where rates are set results in lower rates than if members of the 
public were not present (1984, pg. 554).     
 In his study of a regulatory commission in Chicago, Sabatier used a case study 
approach to determine the necessary conditions where a constituency supportive of 
aggressive regulation is able to monitor regulatory policy making (1975).   Sabatier cites 
the case of the Clean Air Coordinating Committee of Chicago to demonstrate that an 
organized constituency was able to provide external technical expertise, and to effectively 
lobby for a legitimate role in the implementation of a statute (1975, pg 329).    
 The importance of an activist public was again confirmed in Sabatier’s joint study 
with Daniel Mazmanian where they found that there was a positive correlation between 
the presence of the public at meeting voicing opposition and the commissioners voting 
behavior (1980, pg 455).   Although Air Agencies do not use consumer advocates like 
those present in the study of utility regulation, it is hypothesized that the number and 
presence of citizen members on boards will have a positive impact on pollution reduction 
in a state.  It is hypothesized that citizen membership on regulatory boards serves to 
broaden access and participation beyond that envisioned by the earlier studies of Sabatier 
(1975) and Mazmanian and Sabatier (1980). 
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  Mark Schneider et al. (2003) also found information access to be a critical 
component in building consensual networks.  They suggest that requiring public 
participation in order to qualify for financial resources (a criteria imposed by the 1987 
amendments to the Clean Water Act that created the National Estuary Program (NEP)) 
was one of the key features leading to the success in building consensual networks.  
Public participation is also seen to be critical at the policy legitimation stage (Kraft, pg 
62).  Although the CAA requires open meetings and public notices, the extent to which 
citizens are apprised of their potential avenues of participation is deemed important.  
Thus for our purposes I will track whether public participation guidelines are provided 
via the web. 
Information 
 
 Information access is a critical component of the regulatory process, especially 
where the issues are complex and cross-jurisdictional.    Information sharing in 
consensual networks is found to positively contribute to greater cooperation (Schneider et 
al., 2003).  An important success story under the Acid Rain program has been the 
transformation of reporting and emissions data into databases allowing for much greater 
data analysis and tracking than existed previously.  Determining the degree to which 
states take advantage of such resources or provide their citizens with such data remains in 
question.   
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Setting the Stage for Policy Innovation 
 
 Academic treatment of the federal structure, especially in regard to state 
institutions, has undergone many phases.  When the Clean Air Act was first enacted, the 
states were widely perceived as incapable and unwilling to make the hard choices to 
reduce pollution (Rinquist, 1993).  As in other policy arenas, it is generally believed that 
the growth and centralizing tendencies of the national government were largely in 
response to the perception of corruption and “backwater” politics of the states (Lowry, 
1992, pg 1).  At the time of Lowry’s writing he noted that this perception was beginning 
to change.  States were beginning to be regarded as the locus for policy innovation.  The 
Federal Government and its myriad agencies were getting too large, too bureaucratic and 
too sluggish to confront the policy challenges of the late twentieth century.  
 There is a renewed interest in federalism as states move to exceed the minimum 
standards set forth in the Clean Air Act (Potowski, 2001; Wood, 1991).  This 
transformation of many states to proactive regulating entity did not happen overnight.   
As demonstrated in Chapter One, cities first began to regulate but the pollution spread 
beyond their boundaries, therefore states slowly stepped in to expand regulation.  As the 
problems worsened and public sentiment reached a climax, the federal government 
stepped in, but only to a degree.  National standards were set, but states retained both 
permitting and enforcement capacity.   
 There is, of course, much more to the picture.  Students of federalism often 
explore constraints on institutional behavior such as interest group pressure (Rinquist, 
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 1994; Potoski, 2001), partisanship (Lester, 1980) or economic conditions (Lubell, 2002). 
Academics have long shed the naïveté that all policy decisions are simply deemed the 
right thing to do by the right federal institution at the right time.  Thus it is important to 
look at the distinct behavior of and between the institutions.  What are the triggers or 
watershed events that cause major swings in policy behavior?   
 First I will explore federalism as it relates to pollution problems and the inherent 
difficulties in resolving them.  Second, I will explore policy literature that disavows the 
earlier assumption in academic literature that agencies or boards are often “captured” by 
those they regulate to the detriment of the public good.  Next, I will consider network 
theories of policy innovation and their relevance to our purposes here.  In conclusion, I 
will explore all known empirical studies of pollution reduction at the state level for clues 
to guide us in the present study. 
The Transforming Role of Federalism 
 
 Federalism, once thought to be the slow plodding political beast that dampens all 
hopes of progressive policy generation (see for instance Pressman and Wildavsky 
1973) has received renewed interest from social science scholars.  In his 1992 work, 
William R. Lowry provides an illustration of the dimensions of Federalism that posits 
both vertical and horizontal dimensions (see Figure 4. below).   The vertical axis (Y) 
represents the level of federal involvement.  At the highest level, the federal government 
might preempt state action.  At the lowest level, the federal government might defer all 
action to the states.  Lowry concedes that trends in the leading up to his research in the 
early 1990’s make either case rare across the policy spectrum (Lowry, 1992, pg. 15).  
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 Therefore, he suggests that vertical federal involvement generally varies between the two 
extremes (Lowry, 1992, pg. 15).   The horizontal axis represents the potential for 
interstate competition for resources, and or the export/import of goods, including 
externatilities such as the case of cross-boundary pollution (Lowry, 1992, pg 10).  
Figure 4.  Dimensions of Federal Policies Affecting Leadership 
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Source:  Lowry (1992, pg 11) 
 
 Lowry suggests that the axes of x (interstate competition) and y (federal 
involvement) should be thought of as scales rather than as dichotomous variables.  
Further, he argues that these dimensions significantly affect both the leadership and 
coordination of state behavior. Lowry posits that states are faced with trade-offs.  On the 
one hand they may choose to eschew filling in the gaps in vaguely worded federal 
statutes on pollution and therefore present an “industry-friendly” posture to compete for 
economic resources.  Alternatively, states may create more stringent regulations, or adapt 
innovative and experimental approaches to pollution control in an attempt to promote 
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 quality of life issues and attract non-polluting business.  He believes that the potential for 
horizontal competition is therefore an important determinant of state behavior. 
 Lowry, like others after him (Rinquist, 1993; Potoski, 2001; Potoski and Woods; 
2002) looks at state leadership in the context of severity of needs (extent of pollution 
within their borders), pressure of relevant interest groups, availability of resources 
(generally using agency budgets as a measure), political culture and federal aid.  Yet none 
of these combinations have conclusively accounted for the variation of state programs.  Is 
it possible that the institutional structure by which policy is devised and implemented is 
important in modeling the state pollution control within a federal model?    
 In an interesting twist on federal logic, Dan Wood found that enforcement actions 
in air quality substantially increased after three important events during President 
Reagan’s tenure (his inauguration, budget changes in fiscal 1982, and the departure of 
EPA director Buford).   Reagan’s anti-regulatory stance and budget cuts at EPA signaled 
to the states that they once again had the reigns in environmental enforcement and in 
many cases states accepted those reigns with relish.  In 1980 alone states enforced more 
cases with more personnel bringing enforcement levels higher than even in the Carter 
years. Yet, Reagan’s intent was to curtail all financial supports to State Agencies and 
beginning in 1982 grants-in-aid to state environmental programs were cut by 12% 
(Woods, 1991, pg 852).   
 Scholars agree that multiple coalitions at both vertical and horizontal levels across 
institutions create strong intergroup cooperation to limit the impacts of political stimuli 
such as the three events in the Woods study (Waller, 2000; O’Toole and Meier, 2004; 
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 Woods, 1991; Sabatier, 1987).  The net effect is to dampen policy responsiveness to 
retrenchment stimuli caused by partisan activity (Woods, 1991).  On a similar vein, 
Christopher Waller conducted a study of the Federal Reserve Board.  He systematically 
explored the jarring effects of partisan politics and random election outcomes that 
generally produce policy uncertainty.  He found that the introduction of an independent 
policy board with discretionary powers resulted in what he termed “policy smoothing” 
(Waller, 2000).  His results mirror those of Woods in suggesting that removing decision-
making from the political process and professionalizing those charged with specific 
duties will yield less fluctuation due to political cycles in critical policy areas.   
 The surprising results of Woods study empirically stress that state environmental 
programs proceeded as though the Reagan election and federal budgetary constraints 
never occurred.  His study raises an interesting question, was the state response in this 
brief time period atypical?  Consider for instance the following, extracted from the Acid 
Rain 2004 progress report: 
For 32 states and the District of Columbia, annual SO2 emissions in 2004 
were lower than emissions in 1990. Among these states, 13 decreased their 
annual emissions by more than 100,000 tons between 1990 and 2004: 
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, 
Missouri, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and West Virginia. 
The states with the greatest reductions were in the Midwest and include 
Ohio (1.1 million tons reduced), Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri, each of 
which reduced over 500,000 tons.  (EPA, 2004, pg 6) 
 
 Can the reductions noted be attributed to the emissions trading market only?  Or 
are other state level factors at work?  Such reductions undermine prior theory that states 
avoid and or only marginally regulate important industries. In the NAPA report, it was 
determined that state regulators find that the New Source Review permitting process to 
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 be critical to maintain or improve air quality.  Some states, where approved by state law, 
have also sought more stringent standards for both SO2 and NOx (NAPA, 2003, pg 13).  
This again undermines the contention that states avoid making hard choices in regard to 
strong industries within their borders, or that they simply abide by the federal mandates 
however distasteful the reams of red tape.   
 According to NAPA, from a federal standpoint, the design of the NSR program 
has left too much uncertainty in requiring existing facilities to obtain permits prior to 
upgrading their facilities.  Additionally, although it creates enormous red tape for the 
states, the paperwork is not streamlined or automated so that increased emissions can be 
checked against permitting databases.  Facilities are allowed to determine whether plant 
upgrades will result in additional pollution leaves a gaping hole in enforcement, and it 
appears the air seeping out is not always clean.  In many cases States wait for the EPA to 
recognize increases in pollution, yet the EPA is hamstrung because not all of the states 
were provided their permitting information electronically.  Changes reflected in 1999 
have enhanced the electronic submittal of data so that the problems reflected in the 
NAPA report should no longer be at issue.  However, the problem of self-policing by 
polluting industries and utilities remains at issue.   
  On the flip side, states have stepped in where “policy voids” exist (Adler, 1998; 
Krane, 2007). Maarten Hajer suggests that institutional voids exist where established 
institutional arrangements lack the power or ability to resolve particular policy dilemmas 
(Hajer, 2003).  Instead, “transnational, polycentric networks of governance” arise 
wherein power is dispersed (2003, pg 173).  Cases such as air regulation where traditional 
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 regulatory solutions have failed to fully achieve policy goals are primary candidates for 
collaborative approaches.  In cases of uncertainty or complexity, collaborative 
relationships can be effectively utilized to seek innovative solutions across jurisdictions 
and boundaries where more tightly controlled hierarchical solutions fail.  The problems 
inherent in NSR represent such an opportunity. 
 In cases of uncertainty or complexity collaborative relationships can effectively 
leverage expertise that might otherwise be unavailable.  A local group may have a much 
better handle on the sources of a particular problem and on solutions that would work for 
their communities, but they may lack the engineering or scientific expertise to design the 
needed solution (Fischer, 1993).  Collaborations can supplant unnecessary duplications 
across local, state and federal levels by effectively sharing expertise across jurisdictions.  
Watershed partnerships represent a key demonstration of this (see for instance Lubell et 
al., 2002).  O’Toole and Meier (2004) develop this concept further in regard to public 
education, noting that there is a heavy tilt toward collaborative intergovernmental 
arrangements in most national programs (pg 494).   In fact, much national legislation now 
requires agencies with overlapping service areas to collaborate to gain greater 
efficiencies. 
 Federal and state officials can seek to build collaborative relationships at the local 
level where high levels of distrust undermine policy development.  Engaging locals and 
entering power sharing relationships can help build trust across jurisdictions, and trust in 
government more generally.  Frances Lynn argues that taking the time to build 
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 community trust is critical but time-consuming, but the establishment of trust is crucial to 
the effectiveness of the partnerships (Lynne, 2000).  
 Fiorino builds on the linkage between trust and the limits of technocratic expertise 
as he notes that environmental policy has gone through three distinct policy phases 
(2001).  The first stage, entitled technical learning, entailed high levels of technical and 
legal proficiency with concomitant issues of institutional fragmentation and adversarial 
relations between actors and institutions.  While scientific and technical expertise was 
brought to bear on important issues such as pollution and clean water, public trust slowly 
eroded over time as pesky problems remained unsolved and an engaged public felt 
disenfranchised.  They believed that industry not people set the terms.  See for instance 
the discussion of “capture theory” below. 
 “Conceptual learning,” picked up where technical learning left off.  There was a 
growing recognition that not all problems have technical solutions (see for instance the 
insightful discussion of this in Garrett Hardin, “the Tragedy of the Commons” (1962). 
This leads us to the “learning model of administration” proposed by Fiorino.  The 
learning model suggests that actors can adapt past strategies to present circumstances, 
learn from the successes and failures of others.  This knowledge-based orientation to 
policy-making assumes that policy is purposive.  “Policy makers are seen less as passive 
forces driven by political and interest group pressure than as sources and implementers of 
ideas, information, and analysis that influence choices (2001, pg 322). 
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Social Learning 
 
 As environmental policy shifted from command and control to a more conceptual 
focus that recognized the interrelationship between problem definition and policy 
strategies, a new emphasis emerged on social learning. Fiorino envisions social learning 
as the capacity of the government unit, in conjunction with stakeholders and citizens, to 
work collaboratively and cooperatively both to define goals and implement shared 
decisions. He also envisions social learning to allow for a more adaptive network-based 
administrative focus, rather than the former command and control structure.   Social 
learning is predicated on three key features:  structural openness, different approaches to 
implementation and recognition of uncertainty (2001, pg 328).  Fiorino’s learning model 
shares important features with O’Toole and Meier’s work on structural networks and 
public management (2004, 2003).     
Structural Openness  
 For Fiorino, in the environmental context, the technical environment was 
premised upon top-down regulatory control that isolated regulants from regulators and 
fostered adversarial relations, social learning embraces structural openness premised 
upon continuous processes of interaction and communication (read deliberation) between 
social actors, groups, stakeholders, industry and governmental actors.  Advisory boards 
can be seen to have risen out of this trend, and policy boards can be seen as the next step 
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 in the learning process in that they now allow for various actors to have greater power to 
impact the process beyond simple advisory mechanisms.   
 O’Toole and Meier’s model also recognizes that today public managers must 
often coordinate with parties beyond their explicit control.  Arrangements are necessarily 
informal, complex and across multiple bureaucracies and external entities.  They note the 
current dearth of empirical research on intergovernmental networks (Watershed 
partnership research serves as important exception, see for instance Schneider et. al. 
2003).  
Different Approaches to Implementation 
 The top-down command and control regulatory model is supplanted by a more 
fluid process under a social learning model.  Unlike the traditional adversarial approach, 
this model presupposes that all actors will work collaboratively and cooperatively both to 
define goals and implement shared decisions.  There is a trade-off in this model that some 
in the activist environmental community have difficulty embracing, it does allow for 
more industry input in shaping policy, yet it also requires them to share responsibility in 
achieving government goals (2001, pg 328).   
 The Cap and Trade system represents an innovative approach to emissions 
reduction in that it does not dictate the precise details of the technologic alterations to 
plants in order to meet emissions targets; rather it sets both ceilings and floors for the 
purposes of regulation and gives firms the opportunity to make individualized decisions 
on how to effectively meet the standards.  This, however, does pose a challenge for the 
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 states.  How do they integrate this new strategy into their existing toolset?  Do they 
relinquish all activity in regard to SO2 utility generation to the Federal government?  Or 
do they continue with prior efforts to maintain or exceed NAAQS standards as they have 
in the past?  O’Toole and Meier’s research suggest that Public Management matters, and 
in this context it suggests that continued reductions in SO2 emissions may vary across 
states and may be correlated to the means by which states participate in this transforming 
intergovernmental network.  
Recognition of Uncertainty 
 As Fiorino notes, time has tempered the optimism that scientific progress and 
technocratic administration can overcome all challenges in the environmental realm.   
He notes that Europeans have invoked the “precautionary principle” as a guide to policy 
action: 
 When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the 
environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and 
effect relationships are not fully established scientifically. In this context the 
proponent of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof. 
The process of applying the precautionary principle must be open, informed and 
democratic and must include potentially affected parties. It must also involve an 
examination of the full range of alternatives, including no action.” - Wingspread 
Statement on the Precautionary Principle, Jan. 1998 (retrieved from the Science 
and Environmental Health Network http://www.sehn.org/precaution.html, January 
12, 2008). 
 
 Rather than defend the classic presumption that all problems have technical solutions, 
the precautionary principle reminds us that policy decisions must be made in an 
environment bounded by a multitude of constraints ranging from political will, available 
resources to concerns about possible consequences of options chosen.  Scientific 
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 uncertainty builds tentativeness into the policy process that was not available in the 
command-and-control regulatory approach.  This opened a gateway to a cooperative 
integrated policy development stage such as the network approach advocated by Meier, 
Teske and others.   
 In air quality control it is noteworthy that continued uncertainty persists in many 
critical areas, such as uncertainty as to the appropriateness of current NAAQS standards 
(Bachmann, 2007), the lack of exhaustive monitoring networks, and the continued 
funding and enforcement challenges states face in these areas.  The current lack of 
performance-based standards ties in to all of these key issue areas.     
 New Source Review (NSR) is key for states in maintaining National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS).  NSR enables a state to evaluate all new sources of 
emissions and issue permits to ensure that state air quality is not degraded. In regard to 
New Source Review the National Academy of Public Administration found the EPA had 
never collected the following core data on basic aspects of the NSR program: 
 Environmental effects; 
 Market impacts and economic costs; 
 How it was implemented by state and local agencies; 
 How many facilities it may cover; 
 Whether it has promoted markets for cleaner technologies; 
 What actions require an application for an NSR permit; 
 How regulated facilities can comply with NSR; 
 How many facilities use netting; and  
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  How many facilities obtained synthetic minor permits (NAPA, 2003, pg. 27) 
Had variation in how states implement NSR been tracked, it is possible that more 
effective strategies could be shared and cost-cutting measures better utilized.  Instead 
we are left to wonder about the appropriateness of current methods. 
 The combination of scientific uncertainty with regulatory uncertainty complicates 
all levels of federal activity.  Barring states taking matters in their own hands, industry, 
and for our purposes utilities, are able to operate without constraint.  A troubling example 
is the discretion left to regulated entities in calculating potential future emissions, known 
as the WEPCO rule.  Utilities are allowed to model their actual-to-projected actual 
emissions and are not required to submit a request for a NSR in the absence of projected 
increases of emissions.  The rule requires utilities to maintain and submit records to the 
permitting authority citing evidence that modifications did not result in an emissions 
increase for five years.  However, it does not detail verification procedures or 
consequences if greater levels of emissions are found (NAPA, 2003, pg. 28).  NAPA 
found that from 1997 to 1999 there were only 850 NSR permits issued to facilities in 
PSD areas- this out of 17,000 regulated facilities (NAPA, 2003, pg 15)! 
 Further complicating matters, there is no standard for tracking permitting vs. 
pollution outcomes.  Neither is there a standard for confirming that permits are attained 
prior to technologic alterations at facilities.  It is unclear at this juncture how the Cap and 
Trade program has altered this landscape at the state level. 
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Capture Theory 
 
 The above cited lack of institutional coordination and information may lead one to 
believe that industry, and for our purposes here utilities, have “captured” the agencies 
charged with regulating them and have encouraged such loop-holes and reporting gaps to 
protect the status quo.  Berry details the evolution of this theory (see for instance 
Bernstein, 1955 as quoted in Berry, 1984).  Proponents of capture theory, as developed 
through a small series of case studies, suggest that regulated groups tend to develop close 
relations with their regulating agency personnel and thus “capture” the agencies to the 
benefit of their industry.  Berry challenges this theory in his study of State Public Utility 
Commissions.  Here he finds little evidence to support the capture theory.  He finds that 
commission professionalism serves as a mediating influence on industry power. 
Additionally, he finds that public accessibility such as the right to participate in the 
regulatory process through attendance at public meetings and public comment periods is 
also a factor. Information access is also critical for both the commission representatives 
and the general public.   
Trends in State Research 
 
 Randy Becker takes on Pollution Abatement Expenditures by US Manufacturing 
Plants.  He hypothesized that areas with higher home ownership rates and per capita 
income would have more pollution abatement activity (defined in the Pollution 
Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) survey as the sum of both pollution treatment 
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 and pollution prevention).  Additionally, he anticipated that the higher the % of 
manufacturing employees the lower the pollution abatement expenditures.  Finally, he 
anticipated political ideology would play an important role.  He operationalized political 
ideology as the number of citizens voting democratic in the most recent presidential 
election.   
 Becker found that areas with high home ownership, a concentration of 
Democratic voters and domicile within a Metropolitan Service Area leads to higher 
pollution abatement expenditures.  Conversely, in areas with a high incidence of 
manufacturing employees pollution abatement expenditures are reduced.  He did not find 
any evidence that voter turnout (his measure of collective action) had an impact on 
pollution abatement expenditures.  He also found evidence of raced-based spending 
mixed.  In areas of non-white populations spending was lower, yet in areas with many 
foreign-borns spending was higher.  It is in these two categories that an important fact 
arises for our purposes, once he controlled for state and county level regulation the 
negative impacts toward non-whites disappeared, suggesting an important role for state 
and local regulation (Becker, 2003, pg. 21).   
 Wayne Gray and Ronald Shadbegian also look at socio-economic and political 
factors in the siting of Paper mills and find results generally consistent with Becker.  Of 
particular interest is their recognition that plants bordering states with more pro-
environmental regulatory stances tend to emit less than those plants bordering more 
brown-leaning political environments.   Additionally, they find that plants near the 
Canadian border tend to emit significantly less SO2.  Although they reflect that this may 
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 be due to political pressures, they are unsure of the source or mechanism by which this 
information is conveyed.  This again confirms the need to better understand internal state 
dynamics in influencing policy outcomes (2004). 
 John Hoornbeeck conducts research in regard to water pollution policy in a 
similar vein to that envisioned here.  As NAPA (2003) and others do, he laments the lack 
of performance based measures to track state success in improving water quality in order 
to test the value of the devolution strategy in place at the federal level. He uncovers a 
wide variance in policy activism state to state and correlates it with varying state capacity 
and the extent of interest group pressure exerted (2005).  He does not look specifically at 
institutional structure as envisioned herein. 
 The evidence above suggests that states have an ongoing and critical role to play 
in pollution reduction as a key player in a federalized structure.  However, systematic 
investigation of the primary regulating and enforcing actors is lacking.   Do these state 
institutions have an important role to play?  Do they create important policy networks as 
envisioned by Schneider and O’Toole and Meier to devise collaborative solutions to 
complex problems?  If so, what characteristics distinguish such networks from those 
states that continue to lag behind in pollution reduction efforts?
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CHAPTER THREE 
Methodology 
 
 
 The purpose of this study is to test an adapted model of network theory against 
state air pollution control institutions.  Air pollution control presents a regulatory problem 
that has interstate, intrastate and multiple federal dimensions.  It is one of extreme 
complexity and uncertainty, from both a regulatory and scientific perspective.  The 
changing political environment federally has enabled states to redefine their roles in the 
regulatory process (Adler, 1997).  Therefore, I have the potential to uncover widespread 
variation in institutional processes.   
Systematic empirical investigation may yield new insights into how states 
successfully reduce air pollution while at the same time demonstrating the viability of the 
network model of administration across bureaucratic settings. Further, this research may 
add to our understanding of how interagency management of air control impacts the 
effectiveness of the regulations. It is the measured judgment of many in the field that 
there is a dearth of empirical research on bureaucratic systems (Krause and Meier, 2003; 
Smith, 2003; O’Toole and Meier, 2004; Teske, 1991).  The network model of public 
management and performance enables empirical investigation of the bureaucracy, rather 
than a classic study of political institutions.  As such it is well suited to study links 
between process and performance in state agencies.  To date the network model has been 
repeatedly tested in education settings (O’Toole and Meier, 2004; O’Toole, 2003; Meier, 
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 Wrinkle, and Plinard, 1999).  I adapt it here to the environmental policy arena.  These 
two areas have important similarities.  Both have multi-layered bureaucracies beginning 
locally and moving to the federal level.  In both cases important societal values underlie 
the bureaucratic imperatives, but performance measures may or may not be well defined 
across the local to federal spectrum.  Thus a systematic empirical investigation that 
isolates institutional features such as behavioral and managerial networking and 
correlates them to performance measures may lead to important insights.  Lester and 
Lombard note that the field would benefit from more rigorous theoretical arguments, 
greater awareness of intergovernmental relations and less emphasis on single points in 
time, as well as a 50 state strategy (Lester and Lombard, 1990).  This research seeks to 
achieve these goals by generating empirically testable hypotheses with time series data 
across the 48 contiguous states and Alaska.   
While the state represents the unit of analysis, it is the Air Agency with its 
associated air board that is our primary focus.  Why is a focus on agencies important?  
Incorporating the what, why and how of agency structure and networking behavior may 
help to explain variations among states that other scholars fail to account for by focusing 
exclusively on political and legislative institutions as well as interest group behavior.  
Failing to account for the state air agency as an important institution within the federal 
structure leaves us with an incomplete picture of the democratic process as it plays out in 
policy implementation.   
This study adapts the Network Model to empirically investigate the importance of 
administrative structure within state air agencies and their impact on performance 
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 measures of air quality.  This study seeks to gather data over the period of 1999-2007 and 
therefore a panel data time-series design is deemed appropriate.   This time period is 
chosen due to changes in EPA reporting that will enable a robust sample (in regard to our 
dependent measure, pollution outcome)  to be drawn for the period in question.  The data 
prior to 1999 is not considered directly comparable to 1999 and beyond due to retooling 
of the database maintained by the EPA. 
  The data will be structured as a pooled time series dataset.  The analysis plan is 
as follows, a pooled regression model will be fit to the data first.  Next, a Least Squares 
Dependent Variable (LSDV) approach will be used under the assumptions of a fixed 
effects model.  This methodological tool combines the advantages of both a cross-section 
and a time series, and removes the unit-specific error from the error term by fitting 
dummy variables to estimate a fixed effect (Sayrs, 1989).  Additionally, the LSDV model 
allows us to use an intercept to capture effects unique to cross-sections as well as those 
that may be unique to time (Sayrs, 1989, pg 28).  As with any regression technique, 
especially within time-series analysis there remains some level of autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity.  This basically means that it is likely that what happened at time T in 
state A likely impacts what happens at time T+1 in state A.   
A fixed-effects model essentially omits any variable that is invariant.  As many of 
our key variables of interest are invariant, including the number of citizen members of 
boards, the presence of an air board and the presence of citizen participation guidelines, I 
also fit the model to two random models:  the generalized least squares model (GLS) and 
the GLS with  AR(1) disturbance.  The first GLS model assumes a one-way interaction in 
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 the data.  This basically means that the model is able to anticipate differences across 
groups, in this case the states.  GLS with AR (1) disturbance assumes some level of 
autocorrelation between x and y variables and therefore enables us to comprehend 
differences across both states and years in our analysis.  A Hausman test and a Breusch 
and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects will be applied to determine the 
appropriateness of the LSDV or GLS models. 
Research Question: 
Given the importance of reducing air pollution to protect public health does 
the institutional structure within state departments of environmental quality 
coupled with citizen participation and information access correlate to quantifiable 
differences across states in pollution reduction over time? 
Research Subject: 
The Unit of analysis of this research is the state institution or institutions charged 
with enforcing criteria air pollution reductions under the Clean Air Act of 1970.  This act 
initially applied to the 48 contiguous states.  Subsequent amendments incorporate Alaska 
and Hawaii.   Hawaii is not included in this analysis because of its initial exclusion from 
the CAA and due to the fact that its air quality problems often stem from problems 
associated with volcanic ash producing VOG (a relative of smog).  Therefore all states 
but Hawaii are included in this analysis. 
 Clean Air Agencies are the generic term used throughout for all state institutions 
charged with air control, even if that grouping or division falls within a broader agency 
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 such as a Department of Environmental Quality. Air policy boards are a subset of the 
agency that will represent a critical focus of this research. In regard to public 
management variables I will focus on the top official for air control, labeled here as the 
air administrator.  
Dependent Variables 
  
 Ozone exposure index:  The ozone exposure index represents the number of days 
per year that pollution outcomes are not in the healthy range (i.e. they exceed the 
minimum 8-hour standard for ground-level ozone as defined by the EPA) within each 
state. This data is derived from monitor readings for the 8-hour ground-level ozone 
standard as defined by the EPA rule process.  (EPA officials removed any instances 
where the readings were deemed to be extreme events.)  The index is computed from 
county level EPA records and divided by county population size to create state-level 
exposure levels for a given year that are standardized by population size. For instance, a 
value of one represents a single day in a given year where every person in the state 
experienced ground-level ozone pollution exceeding the standard.  Conversely, an ozone 
exposure index of zero would mean that no one in the state was subjected to ground-level 
ozone above the standard during that year. The mean for the ozone exposure index is 7.55 
with a range of zero to 63.5 for a total of 441 cases (49 states x 9 years).   
 For instance, a value of one represents a single day where every person in the 
state experienced ground-level ozone pollution exceeding the standard.  Conversely, an 
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 ozone exposure index of zero would mean that no one in the state was subjected to 
ground-level ozone above the standard.   
 Below I demonstrate how Alabama’s1999 Ozone exposure index is generated in 
Table 3.    I begin by dividing the county population impacted by the state population 
total and then multiply that figure to come up with the personday figure by county.  Each 
county’s figures are then aggregated for the state total resulting in the ozone exposure 
index.  As the table demonstrates, in 1999 a subset of Alabama citizen’s experienced a 
total of 230 days outside of the NAAQS standard for ground-level ozone.  The ozone 
exposure index is 13.35 meaning that on average the total population of the state can be 
said to have been impacted by 13.35 days where ground-level ozone exceeded the 
standard. 
 
Table 3. Alabama Ozone Index 1999 
County 
Name 
Number of Days 
Above Standard 
Ozone 
County 
Population 
Impacted 
State 
Population
County 
Population 
divided by 
State 
Population PERSONDAYS
Clay 33 14012 4369862 0.00320651 0.105815
Elmore 5 63488 4369862 0.01452861 0.072643
Jefferson 39 657422 4369862 0.15044457 5.867338
Lawrence 28 33795 4369862 0.00773365 0.216542
Madison 31 280381 4369862 0.06416244 1.989036
Mobile 31 399652 4369862 0.09145644 2.835149
Montgomery 15 215813 4369862 0.04938669 0.7408
Shelby 45 146392 4369862 0.03350037 1.507517
Sumter 3 15615 4369862 0.00357334 0.01072
  230   4369862 0.41799261 13.34556
Source:  Data generated by merging of EPA and Census data (2009) 
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 Justification for Measure 
 
   The adverse health effects of ground-level ozone exceeding the 8-hour 
standard are well documented (Bates, 1995).  Populations negatively impacted annually 
are in excess of 160 million across the United States (www.4cleanair.org retrieved March 
24, 2008).  Further, ground-level ozone is one of two pollutants considered to have the 
most widespread health effects of any of the criteria air pollutants 
(http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/6poll.html, retrieved March 24, 2008). Ground-level 
ozone is often correlated with emissions of other criteria pollutants such as SO2 and NOx 
from point sources such as coal fired power plants.  Precursors to ground-level ozone also 
include non-point sources from NOx and VOCs.  The state level impacts are found 
through ambient air monitoring as mandated by the National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards(NAAQS).  Because state air agencies are charged with the implementation and 
enforcement of these standards, the ozone exposure index per year represents our 
dependent measure.  Positive performance outcomes will be seen as evidence of a 
reduction in the incidence of ground-level ozone pollution experienced over time by the 
state population, as represented by the ozone exposure index. 
 By combining census data to standardize across states I present a measure that has 
utility for statistically testing.  At the same time the measure connects local impacts of  
ground-level ozone pollution.  This dual connection between a standardized measure and 
its real-time public health impact, is, to my mind, the strength of this index. 
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  Other research has often utilized the toxic release inventory as a dependent 
measure(Ringuist, 1994).  What the toxic release inventory cannot tell me is where the 
emitted toxins transform into ground-level ozone and represent a danger to human health.  
This is where ambient air monitoring comes into play.  Because I am concerned with how 
states reduce pollution within their borders to specifically protect public health, the ozone 
index measure I have developed better serves me in answering this question. 
 
Potential Limits of Ozone Exposure Index 
 
A noteworthy limitation in gathering accurate data on monitoring of the NAAQS 
is that the monitoring network does not provide full coverage of all potential areas in the 
United States that may be subject to unsafe levels of ground-level ozone.  Although an 
increasing number of monitors have been installed since the 1990 CAA amendments, it is 
possible that not all pollution is captured in our dependent measure.  However, since this 
problem is deemed widespread throughout the US it is considered sufficient to use the 
monitoring data available through the EPA.  Annual nonattainment data is provided by 
county beginning in 1999 through 2007.** 
Independent Variables 
Intergovernmental Management 
 
                                                 
* the proposed methodology included particulate matter as a dependent measure. However, I discovered 
that there are various sampling schedules for monitors but to date some monitors continue to report daily 
while others do not, regardless of sampling schedule.  This fact makes it difficult to provide a viable ozone 
exposure index measure and therefore the second dependent variable was dropped from this research. 
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  Intergovernmental management captures the trend wherein managers no 
longer rely on organizational hierarchies to achieve their goals.  Instead managers engage 
in networking activities with others who may not necessarily be subordinates.   
Developing relationships and shared goals across previously hierarchical organizations 
requires skilled interpersonal relations.  Further, pollution control requires an ability to 
integrate the highly scientific aspects of pollution control while at the same time juggle 
the entangled web of networks across federal and state levels.  I hypothesize that 
administrators more effectively manage such tasks as their time in office increases. 
Following O’Toole and Meier I break down intergovernmental management into two 
items:  Managerial Networks and Behavioral Networks.  Each will be addressed in turn. 
 
Stability of Managerial Networks  
 
 Managerial networks focus specifically on the key administrator of an 
organization and his or her role in contributing to organizational stability and agency 
operations. A key factor is the administrator’s tenure in office. Brief tenure in office with 
the resultant high turnover for air administrators would likely fragment the managerial 
networks developed by prior administrators.   
 This variable will be operationalized by capturing the air administrator’s length of 
time in office for each of the years under study.  For instance, in state X, if 1999 
represents the administrators second year in office, it is coded as a two.  In 2000 it is 
coded as a three.  If there is turnover in the office in 2001, the variable is coded as a one 
again, and we begin to repeat the pattern for each additional year in office.  An alternative 
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 variable could have been administrative pay. Meier and O’Toole note that it is 
challenging to create quantitative measures of managerial quality, especially in relation to 
individuals in specific positions (2002, pg. 631).  Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain 
data on pay across all fifty states  Meier suggests that comparisons of administrative pay 
often help us to isolate high performing individuals in a network model (Meier and 
O’Toole, 2002).   
 Studies done to date are often cross-sectional and thus lacking a longitudinal 
component,.  Others view effectiveness from the employees’ perspective rather than as a 
determinant of agency performance (Meier and O’Toole, 2002, pg 631 citations omitted).  
Although it can be argued that pay may be a viable measure of performance, in the 
present case it would not be anticipated to vary across time substantially within a state, 
and additionally we may anticipate variations across states more akin to standard of 
living differences than to measurable differences in administrative performance.  
Therefore tenure in office is selected to best represent the stability of managerial 
networks.  The data collected have a mean tenure of 6.69 years in office and a range of 
one to 29 years of service. 
 Although I anticipated capturing different means of appoint, ranging from civil 
service promotion, direct election and governor’s appointment, I found that all 
administrators for the period 1999 to 2007 where appointed by their state governors. 
The following hypotheses represent intergovernmental management: 
 
H1:  States with greater stability in office of the Air Administrators demonstrate 
lower pollution over time than states with high turnover rates. 
 
H0:   The tenure in office of Air administrators has no impact on pollution levels. 
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 Air Boards as Behavioral Networks  
 Behavioral Networking represents the interaction with diverse actors potentially 
beyond the bounds of a manager’s control.  Air board members and local regions created 
to oversee pollution prevention efforts constitute a similar class to the school boards 
studied under O’Toole and Meier (2004) and the utility rate and telecommunications 
commissions studied under Berry (1984) and Teske (1991).  In each case the board 
and/or local region is statutorily authorized to regulate (to varying degrees) but operates 
quasi-independently of the hosting agency.  In the case of air pollution, the Air boards 
often rely on agency staff to provide all technical support, yet in many cases have final 
authority to approve regulations or convene hearings on enforcement.  
 Boards serve many important functions in air policy regulation much as they do in 
the context of utility regulation and education administration.  In the context of this 
research boards are hypothesized to contribute to citizen engagement within an agency by 
providing a forum for the public to engage in policy debates about air policy.  They 
introduce a singularity of focus on a specific problem, in this case air pollution, and in 
many cases draw upon the various stakeholder populations across a state to allow a 
diversity of voices and levels of expertise.  For this variable I will capture the presence of 
an air board by state.  The mean is .18 with a range of zero to one.  In essence this is a 
fixed effect variable, as all but one state had a board under all years of study.   
 The following hypotheses represent behavioral networks: 
H2:  States with Air Policy Boards demonstrate lower pollution over time than 
states without Air Policy Boards. 
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 H0:  States with Air Policy boards have no impact on pollution levels over time 
than states without Air Policy Boards. 
 
Public Accessibility  
 Although in both the case of utility deregulation and telecommunications 
regulation some agencies chose to create citizen advocate staff positions to represent the 
interests of the general populace before the commissions, it is this authors understanding 
that this practice has not spilled over into air pollution control.   The transformative use 
of the internet offers an opportunity for agencies to disseminate information to state 
citizens easily.  Public participation is built into the Clean Air Act in a variety of ways, 
from requiring time periods for public comment in some but not all instances of state 
action to requiring public notice of meetings.  However, states must educate citizens 
about their rights to participate for that participation to be widespread and meaningful.  
Therefore for our purposes a measure of information access is whether or not the 
umbrella agency such as the department of the environment, or the air agency provides 
specific instructions via the web on public participation.  This dummy variable was coded 
as “1” where explicit “public participation guidelines” were found on the website, or in 
lieu of such document a clear and detailed webpage was present that outlined avenues for 
public participation.  All others were coded as zero.  This too was a fixed effect variable.  
The year measured was 2007. 
 Additionally, the presence of citizen members on the air boards is also 
hypothesized to contribute to public accessibility.  It is surmised that citizen members of 
boards will serve the public interest in working to reduce pollution in their state by 
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 increasing access to decision-making by the general public and by encouraging broader 
information dissemination to the public at large.  This variable is coded as a count of 
citizen members of air boards.  Although a more robust measure capturing average tenure 
in office for all board participants was proposed, that data proved difficult to gather 
across all states.  Therefore, I use the count as a measure of citizen participation in policy 
making at the board level.  The mean for this variable is  .5 and the range is zero to nine.  
I did not find any variability over time for the numbers of citizen members on single 
boards and therefore it is a fixed effect variable. 
The following hypotheses represent public accessibility: 
H3:  States that provide public participation guidelines via the Air Agency website 
will demonstrate lower pollution levels over time. 
 
H0:  The availability of public participation guidelines via the web has no  
impact on pollution levels over time. 
H4:  States that allow for more citizens to serve on Air Policy boards have lower 
pollution levels over time. 
 
H0:  The presence of citizens on Air boards has no impact on pollution levels over 
time. 
Control Variables 
The following control variables reflect other factors that may affect the outcomes 
under study. 
Political Context  
 Policy literature continues to assume that republicans are generally less aggressive 
in pursuing regulation against polluting industries (Konisky, 2007).   Additionally, it is 
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 anticipated that appointments to boards will generally be politically controlled.  Therefore 
party control of the governor’s term of office for each year will be tracked.   It is 
anticipated that split legislatures will also be more pro-environment because public 
opinion in the period under study remains positively correlated to enhanced enforcement.  
Ringquist found similar trends in his research in the early 1990’s (Ringquist, 1993).   
Control of Legislature (dummy variables- means provided)  
 
      Split Control – mean of .27 
  Democratic Control- mean of .36 
  (Republican Control is the baseline) 
Control of Governorship (dummy variable)  
  Democrat Governor-mean of .44 
 
The following hypotheses represent political context: 
 
H5:     Democratic control of state legislatures leads to lower pollution levels over 
time. 
 
H0: Democratic control of the state legislature has no impact on pollution levels  
over time. 
 
H6:  Split control of state legislatures leads to lower pollution levels over time. 
. 
H0:  Split control of the state legislature has no impact on pollution levels over 
time. 
 
H7:  States with Democratic Governors tend to have lower pollution levels over 
time. 
 
H0:  Democratic governors have no impact on pollution levels over time. 
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State Political Conservatism/Liberalism of the Legislature 
 
 To account for ideological differences not represented solely by party 
affiliation I will utilize the adjusted voting scores generated by Anderson and Habel 
(2009).  These scores replicate the original adjusted scores of Groseclose, Levitt, and 
Snyder (1999).  The adapted scores begin with the Annual Americans for Democratic 
Action(ADA) Legislative scores for US House of Representative state delegations.  
These scores are produced annually based on roll call votes on a select number of bills as 
determined by the ADA.  As Groseclose et al. (1999) note, this raises issues about the use 
of scores over time and across legislative bodies.  Their work, and the update and 
replication of Anderson and Habel, allow for indexing to achieve comparability over 
time.   
This variable allows me to provide a potentially more complex picture of 
partisanship than party affiliation provides, especially in regard to regional differences 
and levels of conservatism.  This then provides an additional test beyond party control as 
to whether the ideological climate in the state legislatures impacts pollution reduction 
outcomes  A score of 100 represents a perfect liberal record.  .  Then mean for the 
adjusted ADA score is 40.5 with a range of -8.56 to 98.98.   
The following hypotheses represent political ideology: 
H8:  More liberal states will demonstrate lower pollution levels over time. 
 
H0:  State ideology has no impact on pollution levels over time. 
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 Importance of Coal Consumption Per Capita 1999-2007 
 Coal consumption, especially in relation to utility generation, is responsible for 
high levels of SO2 and NOx emissions and their associated health impacts 
(Environmental Integrity Project, 2007).  Therefore I will track consumption per capita.   
(Source- US Department of Energy).   The mean for consumption is 4.9 with a range of 
zero to 53.78. 
The following hypotheses represent coal consumption per capita: 
H9:  States with higher levels of coal consumption per capita will demonstrate 
lower pollution levels over time. 
 
H0:  Coal consumption per capita has no impact on  pollution levels over time. 
 
Importance of Utilities to State Gross Domestic Product 1999-2007 
 As noted above, utilities are the main consumers of coal and coal fired power 
plants are heavily implicated in precursor emissions of ground-level ozone.  Utilities have 
the greatest revenue streams of any regulated industry in the United States (Berry, 1984).  
Therefore an alternative explanation I must explore is whether the strength of the utility 
in a given state correlates with changes in pollution over time. It is anticipated that states 
where utilities contribute a higher percentage to state GDP will correlate to lower 
pollution reduction outcomes over time.  
(-Source-Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce) 
  Evidence from litigation and from the lack of self regulation when completing 
facility upgrades (see for instance Environmental Integrity Project, 2007) suggests 
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 utilities are resistant to regulation.  This expectation is by no means certain; as Becker 
(2003) shows utilities perceive it in their interest to adapt to pollution reduction 
strategies.  The mean for utilities is .02 and the range is .004 to .059. 
The following hypotheses represent the importance of utilities to state GDP: 
H10:  States where utilities represent a higher percentage of state GDP will 
demonstrate higher pollution over time. 
 
H0:  The strength of utilities in relation to state GDP has no impact on pollution 
levels over time. 
 
State Population Density  
 
 Public Health research has shown that the higher the state population density the 
greater the incidence of pollution in excess of National Ambient Air Standards. Ground-
level ozone is often an urban phenomena due to the higher levels of vehicle miles 
confined within urban boundaries coupled with the greater heat generated by the expanse 
of pavement.   Therefore it is important to control for population density.  However, there 
is some evidence that NOx from the excessive car exhaust in cities actually causes 
ground-level ozone to decrease in the city limits and travel outside the city limits into the 
surrounding suburbs and rural areas.  This suggests that suburbs and rural areas are not 
immune from the dangers posed by ground-level ozone.  The mean for population density 
is 186 with a range from 1.1 to 1183.9. 
The following hypotheses represent population density: 
H11:  States with higher population density will demonstrate higher pollution  
levels over time. 
 
H0:  Population density has no impact pollution levels over time. 
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 Local Agencies 
 
As part of the rule-making process, the EPA designates local regions within each 
state due to specific characteristics and geographic boundaries to isolate specific areas 
where pollution is evident (or, where pristine areas exist that require heightened 
maintenance).  In some cases states choose to create local agencies within these regions.  
The mean for local agencies is 3.58 and the range is zero to 35.  Local agencies are a 
fixed effect variable and where measured in 2007. 
The following hypotheses represent local agencies: 
H11:  States with more local agencies will demonstrate higher pollution levels 
over time. 
H0:  The number of local agencies has no impact on pollution levels over time. 
Unemployment 
  
 Becker (2003) found that higher unemployment rates often led to higher pollution 
levels.  Therefore I am adding a control for state unemployment levels.  The mean for 
unemployment is 4.66 and the range is 2.3 to 8.1. 
 
 The hypothesis for unemployment is as follows: 
 
H12:  States with higher unemployment rates will demonstrate higher pollution 
levels over time. 
H0:  High unemployment rates have no impact on pollution levels over time. 
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Adapted Network Model of Administration 
 
My proposed adaptation of the model is as follows: 
Ozone exposure indexit=  α + β1 stability of air agency headit + β2 presence of air 
policy boardit + β3 number of citizen membersit + β4 public participation 
guidelinesit + β5 strength of utility industryit + β6 strength of coal industryit  
+ β7 democratic governorit + β8 democratic legislatureit + β9 split control of 
legislatureit + β10 ideology scoreit + β11 population densityit + β12 number of local 
agenciesit + β13 unemployment + ε. 
 
Analysis Plan 
This research entails the capture of both primary and secondary data. The 
structure of the data is a panel dataset by state for the period 1999-2007.  The EPA 
modernized its data collection techniques for the period chosen, and suggests that 
correlations across prior years would not be deemed appropriate.  This period should 
yield sufficient data to allow for appropriate analysis.  Because I begin with a panel 
dataset I must forgo the use of descriptive statistics attempt to weed out potentially 
flawed variables.   Time-series analysis introduces potential serial correlation that renders 
descriptive statistics suspect.   
The alternative is to test correlations of the variables to discern whether they are 
appropriate or should be dropped.  The second is to use the XTSUM function in Stata.  
XTSUM provides statistical information to designate variables that are time invariant and 
will therefore drop out of the fixed effects models.  Additionally, it provides statistical 
information about whether a variable is well indentified.  Therefore both correlations and 
XTSUM will be generated at the outset of the analysis.  The results of XTSUM will be 
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 used to determine whether to drop or merge variables to best deal with potential 
multicollinearity among variables.   
Next, I will use a variety of regression models to study the impact of the variables 
on ground-level ozone and to best fit a model. Because this research is seeking to explore 
new ground in adapting the network model to the environmental context, the 
methodological assumptions will remain fluid and adaptive as the data is explored.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Data Analysis 
 
 
 The agency centered focus at the core of the Network Model of Administration 
has not been tested in the realm of environmental policy.  Although environmental policy 
has received extensive treatment at the federal level very little is known about it at the 
state level (Ringquist, 1993).  State centered research of environmental policy often 
depends on external measures of commitment such as the Free index developed by the 
Fund for Renewable Energy (Ringquist, 1993, Potoski and Woods, 2001) or the Green 
index developed by the Institute for Southern Studies (Woods, 2006).  These indices are 
used as dependent variables to demonstrate commitment to environmental outcomes, but 
do not provide a mechanism to verify pollution reduction.  This research aims to both fill 
this gap in the literature on state agencies dealing with air policy and to apply the 
Network model outside the context of education. 
 Despite the primary role for the states, federal regulation is expected to 
exhibit national trends in the reduction of ground-level ozone over time.  For instance, 
what is known as the “Acid Rain Program” targeting Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) was 
considered a major success story with a 22% reduction in SO2 emissions despite 
increasing utility power generation in the 1990s.   This program was followed by the 
“NOx SIP Call Program” creating a cap and trade system similar to the Acid Rain 
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 program targeting nitrogen oxides.  Beginning in 2003 this program has also seen 
unprecedented success with a reduction of 60% of  NOx point source emissions based on 
2000 levels (EPA, http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/progress/nbp07.html, retrieved April 7, 
2009).  Therefore, I anticipate national trends to be evident in the data, on average all 
states should demonstrate a decline in ground-level ozone during the period of study.  
However, there remains an opportunity to uncover remaining variation across the states 
and test the validity of the Network Model of Administration.   
 In ranking the fifty states based on the percent reduction from 1999-2007 a 
number of issues become evident.  Although some states made excellent progress in 
reducing pollution, their mean pollution over time may not have been very high.  Thus I 
provide two tables, Table 4. State Ranking by Percent Change in Ozone exposure index, 
1999-2007 and Table 5.  State Ranking by Percent Change in Mean Pollution, 1999-
2007.  Table 4. sorts the rankings by percent reduction over the time period.  Table 5. 
sorts mean pollution over the time period.  These two tables enable a more complex 
picture of pollution reduction to emerge, as some states did have great success in their 
percent reduction of ozone exposure index of air pollution, yet had very little pollution to 
begin with, as the mean scores of ozone exposure index demonstrate.  
 Interestingly, only one of the top ten ranked states for percent reduction in ozone 
exposure index has an air policy board.  Six of the bottom states had air policy boards.  
The top and bottom ten states both had a total of 19 different administrators.  The key 
difference between the top and bottom states in terms of the number of administrators is 
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that California (ranked in the bottom group) topped out at 4 administrators.  In the top 
ten, no state had over three administrators during the period of study.    
 The tables and graphs demonstrate that states have been achieving a reduction in 
ozone exposure index of ground-level ozone over the period in question.  The graphs on 
the relationship of the ozone exposure index to length of service of the air administrators 
within states also suggest that there is wide variation across states in pollution reduction 
across years, and in the linear relationship of ozone exposure index to length of service.  
This sets the stage for our regression analyses. 
  Next I provide a chart demonstrating the relationship between ozone exposure 
index of air pollution and the length of service of Air Administrators.  This chart provides 
a preliminary look at our dependent measure in relation to a key independent variable 
tenure of the air administrator.  It suggests that there is a pattern that may emerge in the 
statistical analysis. 
    
 
 State 
Percent 
Change 
1999-
2007 
Mean 
Pollution Rank State 
Percent Change 
1999-2007 Mean Pollution
1 Nebraska 100.00% 0.209879056 26 Alabama 45.62% 7.254853667
2 Oklahoma 95.20% 6.276105278 27 Vermont 42.80% 1.094738756
3 New Hampshire 84.76% 1.7936726 28 New York 39.90% 5.530135
4 Florida 83.30% 5.061485 29 Minnesota 39.50% 0.305594733
5 South Carolina 80.35% 5.700223333 30 Arkansas 37.03% 2.138598344
6 Mississippi 71.78% 3.006802889 31 Michigan 36.63% 8.224776778
7 Arizona 71.21% 27.55849222 32 Illinois 34.55% 8.685247667
8 Louisiana 68.83% 7.046595444 33 Connecticut 29.67% 15.06735622
9 Wyoming 66.03% 0.122248011 34 Nevada 26.21% 21.56771556
10 New Mexico 64.14% 3.048566778 35 Ohio 19.43% 10.56696989
11 Kansas 62.45% 1.308865133 36 Maine 17.25% 3.728203278
12 Delaware 60.43% 19.44188056 37 Massachusetts 12.30% 7.956268
13 Texas 60.34% 18.60308067 38 Missouri 7.34% 6.2915568
14 Georgia 59.70% 10.40006367 39 Idaho -5.12% 0.892311922
15 Wisconsin 59.26% 5.615446378 40 West Virginia -8.11% 3.223666433
16 Iowa 58.15% 0.548787522 41 California -12.91% 48.88424556
17 Kentucky 56.72% 7.082143456 42 Rhode Island -17.02% 9.477623778
18 Tennessee 56.11% 10.94554144 43 Colorado -29.61% 4.166795333
19 Oregon 54.91% 0.399420122 44 Utah -55.41% 7.824008444
20 Indiana 53.97% 7.907427889 45 Washington -70.33% 1.284039044
21 North Carolina 52.91% 9.705268667 46 South Dakota nominal exposure 0.021833256
22 Virginia 52.31% 7.173347222 47 North Dakota nominal exposure 0.000986267
23 New Jersey 47.61% 12.96711622 48 Montana no exposure  0
24 Maryland 46.71% 10.01313856 49 Alaska no exposure  0
25 
Pennsylvania 46.42% 13.67786433   
National 
Average 40.07% 7.546959
Table 4.  State Ranking by Percent Change in Ozone exposure index, 1999-2007 
Source: primary source data generated by author by combining EPA monitoring data with census population 
estimates. 
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Table 5.  State Ranking by Percent Change in Mean Pollution, 1999-2007 
 
 
Rank State 
Percent Change 
1999-2007 
Mean 
Pollution Rank State 
Percent 
Change 
1999-2007 Mean Pollution 
1 Alaska no exposure 0 26 Missouri 7.34% 6.2915568
2 Montana no exposure 0 27 Louisiana 68.83% 7.046595444
3 North Dakota nominal exposure 0.00098627 28 Kentucky 56.72% 7.082143456
4 South Dakota nominal exposure 0.02183326 29 Virginia 52.31% 7.173347222
5 Wyoming 66.03% 0.12224801 30 Alabama 45.62% 7.254853667
6 Nebraska 100.00% 0.20987906 31 Utah -55.41% 7.824008444
7 Minnesota 39.50% 0.30559473 32 Indiana 53.97% 7.907427889
8 Oregon 54.91% 0.39942012 33 Massachusetts 12.30% 7.956268
9 Iowa 58.15% 0.54878752 34 Michigan 36.63% 8.224776778
10 Idaho -5.12% 0.89231192 35 Illinois 34.55% 8.685247667
11 Vermont 42.80% 1.09473876 36 Rhode Island -17.02% 9.477623778
12 Washington -70.33% 1.28403904 37 North Carolina 52.91% 9.705268667
13 Kansas 62.45% 1.30886513 38 Maryland 46.71% 10.01313856
14 New Hampshire 84.76% 1.7936726 39 Georgia 59.70% 10.40006367
15 Arkansas 37.03% 2.13859834 40 Ohio 19.43% 10.56696989
16 Mississippi 71.78% 3.00680289 41 Tennessee 56.11% 10.94554144
17 New Mexico 64.14% 3.04856678 42 New Jersey 47.61% 12.96711622
18 West Virginia -8.11% 3.22366643 43 Pennsylvania 46.42% 13.67786433
19 Maine 17.25% 3.72820328 44 Connecticut 29.67% 15.06735622
20 Colorado -29.61% 4.16679533 45 Texas 60.34% 18.60308067
21 Florida 83.30% 5.061485 46 Delaware 60.43% 19.44188056
22 New York 39.90% 5.530135 47 Nevada 26.21% 21.56771556
23 Wisconsin 59.26% 5.61544638 48 Arizona 71.21% 27.55849222
24 South Carolina 80.35% 5.70022333 49 California -12.91% 48.88424556
25 Oklahoma 95.20% 6.27610528   
National 
Average 40.07% 7.546959
Source: primary source data generated by author by combining EPA monitoring data with census population estimates. 
 Figure 5.  Graph of linear trend in ozone exposure index and the length of service of air 
administrators 
 
1999-2007 
------------------ ground-level ozone   ------------------ years of service of air administrator 
Source: primary source data generated by author by combining EPA monitoring data with census population estimates. 
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 To begin I create four models, a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model, a 
least squares dependent variable (LSDV) model, and two random effects (GLS) models.  
The pooled OLS model assumes no consistent temporal (annual) or spatial (by state) 
effects.  As noted in Chapter Three, although this is not probable given the theory that led 
to the analysis, it serves as an initial test of our variable’s adequacy given the inability to 
use standard descriptives across a panel dataset. 
 Pooled OLS Model 
 
The pooled OLS model yields significant coefficients for all of the key 
independent variables (See Table 6. below for complete results). Tenure of Administrator 
is significant with a negative coefficient of -0.18 and a probability of 0.00. Presence of an 
air board is significant with a coefficient of 4.02 and a P of 0.00.  Number of Citizen 
Members has a coefficient of -1.23 with a P of 0.00.  The availability of public 
participation guidelines has a coefficient of 2.97 and a P of 0.00.  
 The pooled OLS suggests that air boards are present in states with higher and 
more persistent levels of pollution.  This is not in the expected direction and requires 
further analysis outside of the scope of this inquiry.  See the recommendations for future 
research below for further discussion. 
This model also shows that greater coal consumption per capita has a negative 
correlation with pollution reduction.  In other words as coal consumption increases, 
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 pollution decreases.  This is consistent with other findings (Teske, 1991; Becker, 2003).  
Population density is not significant with a P value of 0.66.Increasing numbers of local 
agencies per state is in the anticipated direction, demonstrating a correlation to higher 
pollution levels, with a coefficient of 0.96 and a P of 0.00. 
The time period 2000-2002 is significant in this model and positive.  Prior to the 
implementation of the NOx SIP call, national trends for the period were positive.  2003-
2004 is dropped due to collinearity and the period 2005-2007 is not significant.. Although 
the drop in ozone exposure index during 2003 to 2004 was sizeable around the nation, 
much more variation was seen in the data for the period 2005 to 2007.   
The pooled OLS model treats each observation of a states ozone exposure as 
completely independent of the next observation and therefore does not account for 
differences across the timeframe under study or across the states.  The use of a pooled 
model is only acceptable if I was able to account for all possible variation among states 
within the model.  The R2  of  48% suggests that this model accounts for only 48% of the 
variation.  Given this lack of full specification of the model it is appropriate to move to 
test both fixed and random effects models. Theoretically, I am arguing that states are 
different and that their differing institutional practices impact pollution reduction. 
Theoretically, I anticipate that state pollution levels are dependent, in part, on pollution 
levels from prior years.  Therefore, I proceed to tests models that anticipate group effects.  
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Table 6.  Pooled OLS Regression 
 
Source  SS df MS   
Number of 
obs 411.00
      F( 11,   398) 37.65
Model  17840.36 10.00 1784.04  Prob > F 0.00
Residual  18953.03 400.00 47.38  R-squared 0.48
      
Adj R-
squared 0.47
Total  36793.40 410.00 89.74  Root MSE 6.88
         
Person Days Coef. 
Std. 
Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
         
Tenure of Administrator -0.18 0.05 -3.23 0.00 -0.28 -0.07
Air Board Presence 4.02 1.18 3.42 0.00 1.71 6.33
# of Citizen Members -1.23 0.29 -4.23 0.00 -1.81 -0.66
Public Participation 
Guidelines Available 2.97 0.88 3.37 0.00 1.24 4.70
Coal Consumption 2.69 1.11 2.43 0.02 0.52 4.86
Unemployment Rate 0.83 1.10 0.76 0.45 -1.33 2.99
Population Density -0.38 0.86 -0.44 0.66 -2.07 1.31
Local Agencies 0.96 0.07 13.70 0.00 0.82 1.10
2000-2002 2.26 0.85 2.66 0.01 0.59 3.93
2005-2007 -0.40 0.84 -0.47 0.64 -2.06 1.26
Constant 4.22 1.84 2.30 0.02 0.61 7.80
 
 Preliminary analysis showed that several variables could be dropped from the 
model:  Democratic and split party control of the state legislature, Democratic Party 
control of the governor’s office and state ideology as predicted by the adjusted ADA 
scores.   Tests for multicollinearity showed that there was a .55 correlation between 
democratically controlled legislatures and split legislations.  Therefore, I fail to reject the 
following null hypotheses: 
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H0: Party control of the state legislature has no impact on pollution levelsover 
time. 
 
H0:  State ideology has no impact on pollution levels over time. 
 
H0:  Democratic governors have no impact on pollution levels over time. 
 
 Rinquist’s study of air quality mirrored the results in regard to party control where 
he also found no significance (1993).  However, in regard to ideology Ringuist did use a 
slightly different test to capture state ideology that was found to be significant (1993).  
The measure used by Ringuist and a similar measure used by  Hays et al. (1996), 
although found to be significant could not be replicated here.  .  Further research is 
necessary to better isolate the role of ideology in air policy outcomes and for the purposes 
herein the variable is dropped.  
 Additionally, initial review of the data using the xtsum function available 
in Stata for panel data suggested that the Utility variable (strength of utility in relation to 
State GDP) was not well specified within the panels.  Therefore, I fail to reject the null 
hypothesis: 
H0:  The strength of utilities in relation to state GDP is uncorrelated to a reduction 
in ozone exposure index of ground-level ozone. 
Review of the year variables found significant similarities between coefficients 
leading me to pool the years as follows: 1999 is dropped from the model as the first 
instance.  2000 through 2002 are coded together.  2003 and 2004 are coded together.  
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 These two years represented the beginning of the NOx SIP Call implementation and 
displayed a precipitous drop in pollution that was not sustained over the following period. 
2005-2007 demonstrated a continued drop in pollution levels nationally, but more 
consistent with the drops witnessed in 2000-2002.  Note that Stata dropped the 2003 
through 2004 variable due to collinearity with other variables.  These included the other 
time periods and coal consumption per capita. 
Least Squares Dummy Variable Model 
 
Next, I test a fixed effect model with dummy variables.  This is known as the 
Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) model.  The advantage of this model is that it 
allows me to account for differences across cross sections and/or across time.  However, 
as our data has 49 panels (states) and 9 time periods, the fixed effect model requires 48 
dummy variables for states.  Given the small size of the dataset (N=411 where ozone 
exposure index of ground-level ozone pollution > 0), the large number of dummy 
variables may consume the degrees of freedom.  This potentially introduces 
multicollinearity thereby increasing the standard errors and depriving the model of 
statistical power (Yafee, 2003; Wooldridge, 2006).  An additional pitfall of the LSDV 
fixed effect model is that all variables that are constant across time must be dropped.  In 
this case I lose important independent variables such as the presence of an air board and 
the availability of public participation guidelines, as well as the control variables local 
agencies, 2000-2002 and 2005-2007.  It is also evident from the data that there is little 
variation in most of the independent variables across time within states, also potentially 
undermining the utility of the LSDV model.  
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 None of the key independent variables tenure of administrator, public 
participation guidelines present, air board presence and number of citizen members are 
statistically significant in the LSDV model.  The dummy year variables for 2000-2002 
and 2005-2007 achieve significance with P values of 0.00 and 0.03 respectively.  The 
overall R2 suggests that very little variance is explained via the fixed effects model.   
In this model population density actually demonstrates a negative relationship to 
the ozone exposure index with a coefficient of -0.22 at the 0.00 level of significance.    It 
may simply be the lack of variation across both the control and independent variables 
within states that is causing all variables to either lose significance or not move in the 
expected direction.  See Table 7. Least Squares Dependent Variable Regression for 
complete results. 
 84
  
Table 7.  Least Squared Dependent Variable Regression 
Fixed-effects (within) 
regression       
Number of obs 
=   411
Group variable:  State    Number of Groups:  49
         
R-sq:  within 0.16   
Obs per group: 
= min 4
between 0.06    avg 8.4
overall 0.05    max 9
         
     F(16, 357) 6.71
corr(u_i, Xb) -0.99   Prob > F 0
         
Ozone exposure index Coef. Std. Err. t P>t 
[95% 
Con f. Interval] 
         
Tenure of Air Administrator -0.10 0.07 -1.28 0.20 -4.28 -0.97
Presence of Air Board 6.39 4.43 1.44 0.15 -2.32 15.09
# of Citizen Members -0.41 1.40 -0.29 0.77 -3.17 2.35
Public Participation 
Guidelines Available -0.48 3.14 -0.15 0.88 -6.66 5.71
Coal Consumption -0.01 0.05 -0.11 0.91 -0.10 0.09
Unemployment Rate 0.35 0.28 1.26 0.21 -0.20 0.90
Population Density -0.22 0.04 -5.56 0.00 -0.30 -0.14
Local Agencies 0.15 0.99 0.15 0.88 -1.79 2.10
2000-2002 1.91 0.50 3.84 0.00 0.93 2.89
2005-2007 1.15 0.54 2.14 0.03 0.10 2.22
Constant 45.37 8.05 5.64 0.00 29.54 61.19
         
sigma_u  59.10       
sigma_e  3.94       
rho  1.00 (fraction of variance due to u_i)    
         
F test that all u_i = 0:   
F(48, 
352)= 18.13   Prob 
> F = 
0.0000 
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 Generalized Least Squares Random Effects Model 
 
 Because many of the independent and control variables are either time invariant 
or marginally so I also test a random effects model (generalized least squares.)  The 
random effects model assumes that the error term (the function of a mean value plus a 
random error) must be uncorrelated with the regressors.  It also allows for time invariant 
regressors as noted above.  In this model, the Air Board is positively correlated to ozone 
exposure index of ozone pollution with a significance level of 0.08.  As in the pooled 
OLS model, the positive correlation is unexpected with a coefficient of 4.68.   
Local agencies have a significant and positive relationship to increases in ozone 
exposure index of ozone exposure as expected.  Local agencies represent an opportunity 
to create additional networks to tackle pollution problems in a state.  However, they are 
initially defined as regions via EPA designations due to characteristics specific to its 
geographical location.  Therefore I anticipate that more regions in a state will more likely 
demonstrate more pollution problems in the state.   The data confirms this with a positive 
coefficient of .94 with a probability of 0.00.   
The number of citizen members present on air policy boards is in the expected 
negative direction with a coefficient of -1.18 with a probability of 0.08.  Public 
participation guidelines fail to achieve significance although the coefficient is in the 
expected negative direction. None of the control variables are significant in the random 
effects model.  
 The dummy variables for 2000-2002 are statistically significant and positive with 
a coefficient of 2.28 and a probability of 0.00.  The time period 2003-2004 drops out of 
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 the model due to multicollinearity with other variables.  These years represent the initial 
implementation of the NOx SIP call and demonstrate the greatest annual pollution 
reduction nationally for the period under study.  The years 2005-2007 exhibit a negative 
correlation of .11 but are not statistically significant.  This suggests that the main 
variation in ozone exposure index during this period is at the state level rather than a 
national trend represented by the time dummy variable of 2005-2007.  
 The rho test within the generalized least squares model tests as to whether there 
are significant group effects within the model.  The rho of .70820794 suggests that 70% 
of the variation in ozone exposure index is related to significant state level effects, which 
implies that the pooled OLS is inappropriate and a group effects model such as GLS is 
appropriate.  See Table 8.  Random Effects GLS model for complete results. 
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Table 8.  Random Effects GLS Regression 
Random-effects GLS 
regression    Number of Obs = 411
Group variable: State    
Number of 
Groups = 49
R-sq:  within = 0.08   
Observations 
per group = 4
between= 0.54    avg = 8.40
overall= 0.48    max = 9.00
Random effects u_i Gaussian    Wald 
chi2(10)      
= 76.60
corr(u_i, X)=0 (assumed)    Prob 
> chi2        
= 0.00
Ozone exposure index Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
Tenure of Air Administrator -0.11 0.07 -1.64 0.10 -0.25 0.02
Presence of Air Board 4.68 2.68 1.75 0.08 -0.57 9.93
# of Citizen Members -1.18 0.69 -1.71 0.09 -2.54 0.18
Public Participation 
Guidelines Available -0.80 1.71 -0.47 0.64 -4.16 2.56
Coal Consumption -0.03 0.05 -0.52 0.60 -0.12 0.07
Unemployment Rate 0.02 0.27 0.07 0.95 -0.52 0.55
Population Density 0.00 0.00 1.27 0.21 0.00 0.01
Local Agencies 0.94 0.18 5.11 0.00 0.58 1.30
2000-2002 2.28 0.51 4.49 0.00 1.29 3.28
2005-2007 -0.11 0.51 -0.21 0.83 -1.10 0.89
Constant 3.26 2.00 1.63 0.10 0.67 7.19
sigma_u 6.14       
sigma_e 3.94       
rho 0.71 (fraction of variance due to u_i)     
 
Generalized Least Squares Random Model with AR(1) disturbance 
 
 A final model will be tested that enables a two-way interpretation of the panel 
data across both time and states.  This model recognizes the potential for serial 
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 correlation across time in a random effects model. The theory that guides this model 
anticipates that there are nationwide effects resulting from EPA rule-making that can be 
attributed to some level of pollution reduction across the states.  This model allows me to 
test for the residual impact left to the states while providing for the serial auto-correlation 
anticipated across time.   
 Teasing out first order serial auto-correlation only slightly alters the correlation 
coefficients for most variables and also marginally improves their significance (as 
compared to the first GLS model). The number of years of service of the air administrator 
is positively correlated to a reduction in ozone exposure over time with a coefficient of -
0.15 and a P value of  0.04.  States with air boards continue to exhibit higher levels of 
ozone pollution with a coefficient of 4.81 at the 0.05 level.  The number of citizen board 
members continues to be significantly related to a reduction in ozone exposure index of 
ozone exposure with a coefficient of -1.18 at the 0.06 level.  Public participation 
guidelines is not statistically significant. 
 The time frame 2000-2002 remains significant, and represents an upward trend in 
ozone pollution.  2003-2004 continues to drop out of the model due to multicollinearity, 
and the years 2005-2007 is not significant. 
 The R2 remains at 48% with the Wald test confirming the significance of state 
level impacts at the 0.00 level.  The estimated autocorrelation coefficient suggests that 
approximately 14% of the remaining variance in the model can be explained by 
autocorrelation across years.  Complete results are available in Table 9. below. 
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 Table 9.  GLS regression with AR(1) disturbances 
Random-effects GLS regression with AR(1) disturbances Number of Obs= 411
Group variable: State    Number of Groups= 49
         
R-sq:  within = 0.08   Obs per group= 4
between= 0.54    avg = 8.40
overall= 0.48    max = 9.00
         
corr(u_i, xb)=0 (assumed)    Wald chi2(10)      = 81.52
     Prob > chi2        = 0.00
         
Ozone exposure index Coef.
Std. 
Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
Tenure of Air Administrator -0.15 0.07 -2.06 0.04 -0.29 -0.01
Presence of Air Board 4.81 2.47 1.95 0.05 -0.02 9.65
# of Citizen Members -1.18 0.53 -1.87 0.06 -2.42 0.05
Public Participation Guidelines 
Available -0.63 1.55 -0.41 0.68 -3.67 2.41
Coal Consumption -0.02 0.05 -0.52 0.60 -0.12 0.07
Unemployment Rate 0.13 0.29 0.46 0.65 -0.44 0.71
Population Density 0.01 0.00 1.7 0.09 0.00 0.01
Local Agencies 0.92 0.16 5.65 0.00 0.60 1.24
2000-2002 2.21 0.53 3.97 0.00 1.07 3.16
2005-2007 0.05 0.54 0.1 0.92 1.01 1.12
Constant 2.80 1.95 1.43 0.15 -1.03 6.62
rho_ar 0.14 (estimated autocorrelation coefficent)   
sigma_u 5.37       
sigma_e 4.14           
 
 The Hausman test confirms the appropriateness of accepting the Random Effects 
model with a chi-square of 42.39 with a probability of 0.000.  See Table 10. below.  The 
Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects also confirms the 
appropriateness of the random effects models with a chi-square of 611 with a probability 
of 0.000  See Table 10. below.  Therefore, the results of these tests and the underlying 
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 theory outlined above leads me to recommend the GLS with AR(1) disturbances 
regression as the best fit for the data.   
Table 10.  Hausman Test 
  Coefficients     
  (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt (diag(v_b-V_B)) 
  fixed   Difference S.E. 
Tenure of Air 
Administrator -0.10 -0.15 0.05 0.02
Presence of Air Board 6.39 4.81 1.57 3.68
# of Citizen Members -0.41 -1.18 0.77 1.25
Public Participation 
Guidelines Available -0.48 -0.63 0.15 2.73
Local Agencies 0.15 0.92 -0.77 0.98
Coal Consumption -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.01
Unemployment 0.35 0.13 0.22 . 
Population Density -0.22 0.01 -0.22 0.04
2000-2002 1.91 2.12 -0.20 . 
2005-2007 1.16 0.05 1.11 . 
            b = consistent under Ho and Ha, obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtregar 
       
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
       
                 chi2(10) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)   
                          =       42.39    
                Prob>chi2 =      0.00    
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)   
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Table 11.  Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Multipler Test 
Ozone Exposure Index[statenum,t] = Xb + u[statenum] + e[statenum,t] 
 
                                                  Estimated results: 
                                            |       Var     sd = sqrt(Var) 
 
       Ozone Exposure Index |   89.73999       9.473119 
                                          e |   15.50842       3.938074 
                                          u |   37.64047       6.135183 
 
                                     Test:   Var(u) = 0 
                                    chi2(1) =   611.40 
                           Prob > chi2 =     0.0000 
 
 While the GLS regression with AR(1) disturbances appears to be the most 
appropriate model for the data, I also find the statistical significance of the coefficients on 
the key independent variables is fairly stable across the pooled, GLS and GLS with 
AR(1) disturbance models.  Table 12. demonstrates the results of the four models across 
the independent variables of interest.  These results demonstrate that the years of service 
of the air administrator, the presence of air boards, and the number of citizen members of 
air boards are statistically significant with little variance in coefficients across the pooled, 
GLS and GLS with AR(1) disturbance regressions.
 Table 12.  Comparison of Pooled, LSDV and Random Effects Models 
Hyptheses  variables tested 
Pooled 
Regression 
coefficients P>|z| 
Random 
Effects 
Model 
coefficients P>|z| 
Random 
Effects GLS 
with AR(1) 
disturbance 
Model 
coefficients P>|z| 
H1:  States with long serving Air 
Administrators demonstrate a greater 
reduction in ground-level ozone 
pollution over time than states with 
high turnover rates. 
# of years of service 
of the air 
administrator -0.175151 0.001* -0.1133864 0.101 -0.1474886 0.04 
H2:  States with Air Policy Boards 
demonstrate a greater reduction in 
ground-level ozone pollution over time 
than states without Air Policy Boards. 
Have air policy 
boards 4.018272 0.001 4.681364 0.081 4.814962 0.051 
H3:  States that provide public 
participation guidelines via the Air 
Agency website demonstrate a greater 
reduction in ground-level ozone 
pollution over time. 
Have public 
participation 
guidelines on web -0.7207265 NS** -0.8002467 0.641 -0.6311454 NS 
H4:  States that allow for more citizens 
to serve on Air Policy boards 
demonstrate a greater reduction in 
ground-level ozone pollution over time. 
number of citizen 
board members -1.234099 0.000 -1.183366 0.088 -1.181583 0.061 
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 Summary of Findings 
Intergovernmental Management 
 
 Two variables represent intergovernmental management for the purposes herein:  
tenure of the air administrator and presence of an air board.  The statistically significant 
results in relation to the tenure of the air administrator demonstrate that as the number of 
years of service increase pollution decreases.  This result was captured across the pooled, 
GLS and GLS AR(1) models.  In regard to air boards, although a statistically significant 
relationship is found, it is not in the expected direction.  This research finds that air 
boards are more likely to be found in states with higher pollution levels and that the 
pollution is not reducing at the pace of other states. 
 Therefore in regard to intergovernmental management I reject the null hypothesis 
in the case of Tenure of the air administrator.  
 
 
H0:   The tenure of the Air administrators has no impact on ozone exposure index 
of exposure over time. 
 
In regard to air boards, I fail to reject the null hypothesis. 
 
H0:  States with Air Policy boards do not demonstrate a greater reduction in ozone 
exposure index of exposure than states without Air Policy Boards. 
 
Public Accessibility 
 
 
 Two variables represent public accessibility:  number of citizens on air boards and 
availability of public participation guidelines.  In regard to number of citizens on air 
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 boards I found statistically significant relationships across the pooled, GLS and GLS 
AR(1) models.  In each case as the number of citizen members increased pollution levels 
decreased. 
 Therefore, I reject the null hypothesis in regard to number of citizen members of 
the air boards. 
  
H0:  The presence of citizens on air boards has no positive impact on pollution 
reduction over time 
    
 Conversely, in regard to public participation guidelines, the variable did 
not obtain significance in any of the models. Due to the lack of significance across all 
models I fail to reject the null hypothesis in regard to public participation guidelines. 
 
 
H0:  The availability of public participation guidelines via the web has no impact 
on pollution reduction over time. 
Control Variables 
  
Political Context 
 
 Variables based on political control of the legislature and governor’s offices were 
created, as well as an ideology variable to test for the influence of party and 
liberalism/conservatism on pollution levels.  I found no statistically significant impacts 
across any of the models and therefore dropped all variables. 
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 Coal Consumption 
 
 I captured coal consumption per capita for all years under study.  It was 
statistically significant only under the pooled OLS model. 
Utilities 
 
 Early testing of the Utility variable demonstrated that it was not well specified 
within the model and it was dropped. 
State Population Density 
 
 Population density is significant in the LSDV model only.   
 
Local Agencies 
 
 Local agencies are significant in both GLS models.  As anticipated, states with 
more agencies tend to have higher pollution levels.   
 
This research leads me to confirm the utility of the Network Model of 
Administration in the context of ground-level ozone reduction across the states.  This 
model demonstrates the importance of public management factors such as the longevity 
in office of the Air Administrator.  It also demonstrates the importance of behavioral 
networking due to the presence of air boards and the numbers of citizen members of air 
boards.  The vitality of air boards without the presence of citizen members remains in 
question as a result of this analysis.  The information component demonstrated by the 
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presence of public participation guidelines via the web did not achieve significance for 
this model.   
 One key finding is that the longevity in office of the Air Administrator is 
an important factor in reducing pollution over time. The highly scientific aspects of 
pollution control coupled with the entangled web of networks across federal and state 
levels suggests that longer serving administrators will effectively navigate these webs of 
networks and serve their organizations well by enhancing pollution reduction over time.  
The second key finding is that the presence of Air Boards with higher numbers of citizens 
also leads to greater pollution reduction overtime.  This suggests that citizen participation 
may have an important role in enhancing network cooperation in the public interest.  
More research on the role of citizens on boards and how they correlate to pollution 
reduction is of interest.   
  
CHAPTER FIVE 
Summary, Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research 
 
 
 This research sought to cover new ground in two significant respects.  First, it 
attempted to apply a revised network model of administration that incorporated citizen 
participation in a new policy arena- air pollution control.  Second, it sought to develop a 
performance measure upon which the success or failure of pollution control efforts could 
be judged.  Performance measures are used extensively in the private sector but have 
been slow to develop in the public sector.  However, this has started to shift.   
Adapting Network Theory to Air Policy Administration 
 
 This research develops a model of air policy administration that incorporates three 
key elements: 
 institutional professionalism 
 the use of air policy boards 
 networking encompassing agency heads, air boards and the public 
The specifically agency centric orientation seeks to shed new light on intergovernmental 
relations by linking institutional process to well defined performance measures.  To 
achieve these aims the network model of administration developed by Lawrence O’Toole 
and Kenneth Meier (2004, 2003, 2002) is adapted.  Their research on state education 
institutions, share key features with air policy administration.  The federal structure is 
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 multi-tiered and multi-layered.  States are mandated to fulfill certain criteria but are given 
latitude in devising their instructional strategies.  Their research targets a number of key 
factors in public management:  managerial effectiveness and stability, networking 
behavior, and administrator’s ability to exploit the environment and buffer environmental 
shocks.  These measures are adapted for the purposes of this research.  Managerial 
effectiveness and stability are represented by the length of the term of office of the air 
administrator.  This variable is coded by the number of years in office of the current and 
former administrators.   
 The next two variables of interest in exploring air policy are adapted from Teske’s 
research into utility boards (1991) and medical licensing boards (2003) and Berry’s work 
on alternatives to capture theory (1984).   Following Gormley (1989) who notes that 
citizens engaged in representing the public is a commonly observed procedural 
innovation that came out of the New Public Management movement, Teske and Berry 
find that citizen advocates and citizen board members serve important public interests in 
their capacity of representing the public on both utility regulatory boards (Teske, 1991, 
Berry, 1984) and medical licensing boards (Teske, 2003).  This research incorporates this 
key function into the network model of administration by constructing two variables.  
The first is the presence of an air board at the agency that is charged with regulatory 
functions. This is a dichotomous dummy variable coded as one for states utilizing boards.   
The second is the presence of citizens on the board.  This is a simple count of the number 
of citizen members on each board.   
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   Information access is deemed a crucial component of citizen engagement in 
institutional processes that are similarly multi-tiered, complex in nature and having both 
scientific and public health implications.  Information access is represented by the 
presence of citizen participation guidelines on the air agencies website.  Dozens of 
studies have noted the importance of organized constituencies to influence agency 
behavior to accommodate the public interest.  However, in a case such as air policy 
where most of the public is oblivious to the primary threats to their person represented by 
threats such as ground-level ozone, basic information dissemination is seen as a key to 
engaging the public.  This is measured by the presence of citizen participation guidelines 
via the web.   
 
 Performance Measures for Air Policy Administration  
 
  This research developed a new performance measure, the ozone exposure index, 
which can be used to evaluate air pollution control efforts. The ozone exposure index 
represents a standardized measure which enables me to compare states.  The measure 
accounts for ambient air quality drilled down to the county level.  This enables me to 
both standardize without losing the core connection to the public health impacts of 
ground-level ozone pollution.  As a performance measure, it provides a reasonable means 
to test whether states are able to reduce pollution levels over time.   
 Robert Behn (2003) suggests that there are eight key reasons for developing and 
using performance measures in public management:  (1) evaluate; (2) control; (3) budget; 
(4) motivate; (5) promote; (6) celebrate; (7) learn; and (8) improve.  By using ambient air 
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 monitoring data in regard to pollution reduction at the state level, I am using real-time 
data on the exceedances of the air quality standard for ground-level ozone.  Although the 
state is certainly not responsible for the weather patterns that give rise to much ground-
level ozone, they are responsible for its consequences.  This measure provides a robust 
and easily available method for tracking progress in reducing pollution over time.   
Key Findings in regard to the Network Model of Intergovernmental 
Management 
Stability of Managerial Networks 
 
In regard to the stability of managerial networks the model produces robust results 
across the pooled and GLS  and GLS AR(1) models.  The length of service was 
negatively correlated with the ozone exposure index in both models demonstrating that 
the longer an administrator serves in office, ceteris paribus, ground-level ozone pollution 
is reduced.     
This finding suggests that the Network Model of Administration has utility in 
policy arenas beyond education.  As others note, “public management matters” (Meier 
and O’Toole, 2002).  The implication in regard to tenure of the administrator is that there 
is potential in tying performance measures such as the ozone exposure index to 
managerial effectiveness.   The findings support a reasonable expectation that expertise 
develops over time and that the longer the tenure the more adapt a manager is at 
maintaining the networks necessary to pursue organizational aims; in this case pollution 
reduction. 
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  If public management matters in regulatory functions, then having an 
administrator adept at managing a complex federal network is seen as key.  The public is 
beginning to coalesce around the idea that global warming is a serious problem, 
especially for future generations (66% consider it to be a major problem for future 
generations in a Marist College Poll conducted April 1-3, 2009).  This telling statistic 
suggests that air policy may become more politicized and high profile. This may create 
more pressures for change.  Therefore the importance of stability to performance-driven 
policy is an important consideration as political turnover routinely occurs in governors’ 
mansions across the country and typically entails turnover of their appointed heads of the 
state air board.  
.  New blood in high-level administrative management positions such as the air 
administrator may not be what the doctor ordered.    This is not to suggest that all 
administrators should keep their jobs.  As Meier and O’Toole have noted, there is a 
paradox of organizational management:  “At the highest levels of performance, stability 
is a good thing. As performance in an organization declines, stability has less value 
simply because the organization is reproducing poor performance (Meier  and 
O’Toole,2003 p 695).  With the introduction of the ozone exposure index as a 
performance measure, governors now have a means to judge the performance of current 
air administrators.   
Intergovernmental Management 
 Air boards are constituted as quasi-independent rule making bodies with the 
ability to promulgate regulations.  Some but not all boards are also given enforcement 
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 duties.  Boards without regulatory powers were excluded from this study.  Many states 
have moved to multi-media boards for the purposes of approving regulations agency wide 
but these were excluded from analysis as well.   
 Boards serve many important functions in air policy regulation much as they do in 
the context of utility regulation and education administration.  In the context of this 
research boards are hypothesized to contribute to citizen engagement within an agency by 
providing a forum for the public to engage in policy debates about air policy.  They 
introduce a singularity of focus on a specific problem, in this case air pollution, and in 
many cases draw upon the various stakeholder populations across a state to allow a 
diversity of voices and levels of expertise. 
 A positive view of boards suggests that the purpose of the board is to allow for 
adequate citizen representation, in conjunction with other stakeholders.   The board then 
works in tandem with the agency to tackle the pesky problem of pollution reduction.  A 
negative view is that the board is constituted to deflect criticism of failing pollution 
control efforts.  Such boards are likely to be weakly constituted and ineffectual in 
engaging in meaningful pollution reduction efforts. 
 Statistically accounting for both boards and the number of citizen members does 
present a challenge.  Obviously there are strong correlations between the presence of 
boards and the number of members serving on boards, for there can be no members 
without the boards.  However, these variables do test for different things and I would 
argue that the presence of a board does not in any way dictate the number of citizen 
members chosen to serve.  In this research I found boards had anywhere from zero to 
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 nine citizen members. There were not sufficient numbers of boards to create dummy 
variables for each count of members, therefore I chose to allow both the airboard variable 
and the count of citizen member variable to remain but to note the multicollinearity 
present. 
 Contrary to expectations, this research found that air boards are more often 
present where pollution is increasing, rather than decreasing.  However, the presence of 
citizen members on the boards turns the table.  Where more citizens are present on boards 
greater pollution reduction outcomes are achieved.  This is consistent with research that 
citizen engagement is important even in cases of technical, regulatory and scientific 
complexity.  This outcome is tempered by the fact that the two variables are statistically 
multicollinear, for there would be no citizen members if there were no boards.  However, 
the variable for citizen members takes in account the specific number of members on a 
board and it is the increasing numbers of citizens that are shown to be correlated to a 
reduction in pollution in states having boards. 
 The limited measure for the presence of an air board does not capture whether or 
not the board is effective.  Issues such as internal expertise, budgets and the extent of the 
pollution problems in the state likely play a role in board success.  Future research could 
delve more deeply into performance measures which capture board success or failure.  
Such measures might include levels of expertise, term of office and funding for boards. 
Citizen Participation 
 
 The findings herein demonstrate that the presence of citizen members on the 
boards has a statistically significant impact on pollution reduction.  This finding suggests 
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 that states with more intransigent pollution problems use air policy boards, and that the 
boards have a more significant impact on pollution reduction strategies if more citizen 
members are present.  This is consistent with the findings of Gormley (1989) and Teske 
(1991, 2003).  Further, this finding is consistent in confirming the importance of a 
participatory role of citizens as demonstrated in the context of water quality networks 
(Schneider et al., 2003).  Their research went a further step to analyze the degree to 
which the networked consensual institutions built trust and established cooperation with 
local stakeholders while at the same time devising regulatory institutions that were more 
adaptive, fluid and locally based.  While the citizen participation measure in this research 
is of more limited scope, its significance in the model does suggest that citizen 
participation in matters of both regulatory and scientific complexity is a societal benefit. 
Information Access 
 The Clean Air Act (CAA) with its amendments requires states to provide 
information on air quality via the AIRNOW system from their primary website.  
Additionally, both the CAA and the NEPA legislation require avenues of citizen 
participation including the right to attend public meetings, to comment on proposed 
changes that impact state pollution levels and so forth.  Yet, if citizens are not aware of 
their rights as set forth in these acts they may not be compelled to participate.  This study 
measured information access as a simple dichotomous variable as to whether a clear and 
concise webpage or accessible document labeled public participation guidelines is 
available to the public via the air agency website.  This measure failed to achieve 
significance in any of the models.  It was not robust enough to capture what citizens 
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 know and the means they use to obtain such information. More research on the role of 
information in engaging citizens will be addressed below in suggestions for future 
research. 
Policy implications in relation to the effectiveness of Air Quality 
Regulations 
 As noted above, there are important policy implications in relation to the 
effectiveness of Air Quality Regulations.  I have demonstrated that public management 
matters in that stability in office of the air administrator.  The tenure of the air 
administrators is positively correlated to a reduction in ground-level ozone pollution over 
time. Further, I have demonstrated that Air boards with higher numbers of citizen 
participants serve an important role in helping to reduce statewide pollution.   
 Air quality continues to resonate with the public as more and more damaging 
health reports come to the surface.  Additionally, more and more citizens accept the 
scientific consensus that global warming is a man-made phenomenon.  Therefore, as all 
air administrators in this study were political appointees, this research suggests that 
incoming Governors would be wise to approach replacing their Air Agencies heads 
cautiously.  High turnover of the air administrator following political election cycles does 
not bode well for long term impacts of pollution reduction as demonstrated by this 
research.  Further, dedicated air boards with citizen membership may help to serve an 
important function in reducing pollution.   
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  More research is needed on how best to engage the citizenry in the reduction of 
air pollution.  The limited dichotomous variable for the presence of public participation 
guidelines did not provide robust results on which to generalize the adequacy of public 
information efforts.  Building consensual institutions in the case of water pollution 
demonstrates the importance of engaging the citizenry and building levels of trust needed 
to serve the public interest (Schneider et al., 2003).  More research is needed on the role 
of the citizen in the regulatory process in regard to air policy.   
Limits of Study 
 Although this study limited itself to an exploration of the reduction of ground-
level ozone across the continental states as mandated in the CAA and its amendments, the 
fact that it mirrors results obtained via the network model of administration in the context 
of education suggest the vitality of the network model of administration in other 
regulatory contexts.    This study also limits itself to the role of state air agencies and 
intergovernmental management at the agency level.  This research does not extend to the 
various levels of the federal system, for instance the regional EPA, the federal EPA or the 
assorted oversight panels at the congressional level.   
 Though the variable of length of service was limited in scope, I considered it 
adequate to demonstrate stability in office of the air agency administrator.   Secondary 
sources on salary trends, staffing levels and annual budgets proved difficult to obtain 
across all fifty states.  Further research may benefit from collecting this data to further 
develop the network model in this regard.  Further research might explore the lack of 
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 readily available budgets that drill down to the air agency level, including the lack of 
access to staffing levels.  What inhibits the annual capture of this information across 
states?   
  The presence of an air board demonstrates an important component of the 
intergovernmental network within air policy.  This research ignores the presence of 
multi-media boards and advisory boards and their relations in the agency.  Further, it 
ignores potential differentiation in how agencies are organized and under what umbrella 
they are found.  For instance, some air agencies are a subdivision of departments of 
environmental quality, others are under the department of natural resources or the 
department of public health.  The research also ignores the internal structural differences 
that may be of significance to a broader understanding of intergovernmental relations.  
Returning to these variations may enhance our understanding of the network model. 
The role of citizen participation is demonstrated through the count of citizen 
members present on air policy boards.  While other research demonstrated the importance 
of an energized citizen constituency (Sabatier, 1975), this research limited itself to an 
understanding of citizen presence on the air board.  As with Teske (1999, 2003) and 
Berry (1984), this research found that the presence of citizens on the air board did serve 
to improve pollution reduction outcomes over time.  Unlike Schneider et al. (2003)  who 
looked at consensual networks and were able to develop measures that incorporated the 
role of citizens in pollution reduction strategies, the measure utilized herein was more 
limited in scope but significant nonetheless.  Further research might seek to incorporate 
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 measures of citizen engagement that were outside the bounds of this research such as the 
presence and number of citizen advocacy groups. 
Directions for Future Research 
 Although the presence of air boards and local agencies are found to be 
significant in this analysis, the fact that pollution is actually greater in those states and 
reducing at a slower rate than others suggests that more research is needed.  For instance, 
many states now use multi-media boards that incorporate air, water and waste.  Further 
research could explore whether important differences in pollution reduction are found 
based on the makeup of multi-media boards.  Are citizen members equally important on 
multi-media boards?   Do the boards serve an important function in generating more 
public support for a pesky problem?  Or do they take the fall for agency inaction?  A next 
step would also be to explore whether citizen participation on other types of boards also 
correlates to reduced pollution in a state.  The question remains as to whether their 
presence on other types of boards is also significant. 
It is also important to explore the reasons boards are present in states with more 
pesky pollution problems where reductions over time are less significant than in other 
states.  What factors give rise to this outcome?  Delving into board authority and the 
membership criteria for non-citizen members may shed light on this unexpected outcome.  
 As noted previously, additional measures of the managerial effectiveness 
including salary and FTE variables may enrich our understanding of the agency.  
Additionally, incorporating other intergovernmental structures and relationships may 
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 shed additional light on the network model.  A better understanding of role of the public 
in the policy process is crucial to a holistic understanding of the policy process.  Such 
research could entail researching public information campaigns at the agency level to 
alert the public to health threats posed by high pollution levels and incorporating such 
efforts into the network model as devised herein. 
 Additionally, the introduction of the ozone exposure index as a performance 
measure yields new opportunities for research.  The ozone exposure index could be 
adapted to test agency performance in regard to other types of pollution to include other 
criteria air pollutants such as nitrogen dioxide or other hazardous air pollutants such 
diesel exhaust from school buses that also threaten public health. 
 Further, current efforts are underway to develop compatible and accessible data 
for health professionals to have access to environmental data that has important 
implications for public health (Kyle et al., 2006).  The criteria air pollutant under study 
here, ground-level ozone, is known to be responsible for increases in hospital visits and 
mortality rates for at risk populations.  The forgoing analysis seeks to better understand 
the relationship of the agency charged with reducing this pollutant and the outcome of its 
regulatory policies.  Testing the utility of tracking monitoring data as a dependent may 
inform current efforts to develop data tracking and sharing techniques to better 
understand the ongoing issues in pollution reduction across the states.   
 A next step in this research could be to merge the data generated herein with 
public health data to develop additional health related dependent measures of interest.  If 
this data could also be merged with meteorological data it is plausible that forecasting 
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 models could be developed to predict hospital admissions during periods of high ground-
level ozone.  This may serve the dual purpose of enabling hospital staffs to estimate 
staffing requirements based on advance predictions of impending pollution, while at the 
same time provide concrete data on which to gauge the true costs of pollution and to 
disseminate that information to the general public.     
 Disseminating more detailed information to the public raises another important 
avenue for further research.  A recent Gallup Poll (March 3-5, 2009) demonstrated that 
American’s view the safety of their drinking water as their top concern (59% of 
respondents).  Only 45% perceived air pollution to be a significant problem.  This stands 
in stark contrast to the reality that there are far greater patterns of mortality, doctor’s 
visits and lost work days tied directly to air pollution than to impacts relating to drinking 
water quality.  Exploring the psychology of citizen’s perceptions of risk is vital to better 
inform efforts to combat air pollution and to bring citizens on board in that effort.  
Directions for research could begin with a comparative analysis of higher performing 
states with low performing states and directly comparing citizen’s perception of the risks 
associated with air pollution.  Do citizens in higher pollution states understand the health 
risks of ground-level ozone pollution that they are exposed to?  To what degree does the 
state agency inform them of those risks?  Such questions might yield fruitful 
opportunities for enhanced research designs utilizing the information component lacking 
in this research.  
 In conclusion, this research successfully demonstrated the 
potential for linking institutional structure to institutional effectiveness 
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 by creating the ozone exposure index.  Further, it demonstrated the 
utility of applying network theory outside of the context of education 
policy.  In regard to air policy, this research demonstrated a robust 
positive correlation between the years of service of the air administrator 
and the reduction of ground-level ozone exposure experienced by the 
state population.  Further, it demonstrated that larger numbers of 
citizen members on air policy boards also had a robust positive 
correlation with the reduction of ground-level ozone exposure 
experienced by the state population.
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 Appendix A.  Definitions 
 
Definitions 
 The following are the definitions that will be used throughout this study.   
Ambient Air Standards limit the concentration of a given pollutant in the ambient air. 
Ambient standards are not emissions limitations on sources, but usually result in such 
limits being placed on source operation as part of a control strategy to achieve or 
maintain an ambient standard (Eastern Research Group). 
 
Best Available Control Technologies (BACT): Best available control technology to 
reduce pollution in accordance with NSPS determinations by the EPA. 
 
Criteria Pollutants are carbon monoxide (CO), lead (Pb), nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur 
dioxide (SO2), volatile organic compounds (VOC), and particulate matter of aerodynamic 
diameter less than or equal to 10 micrometers (PM10). The National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards (NAAQS) were mandated by the Clean Air Act of 1970, and are based on 
criteria including adverse health or welfare effects. NAAQS are currently used to 
establish air pollutant concentration limits for the six air pollutants listed above that are 
commonly referred to as criteria pollutants (Eastern Research Group). 
The nomenclature “criteria” is derived from the requirement that they be regulated by 
developing health (human) based criteria and/or environmentally based criteria using the 
best available scientific assessments for setting permissible limits.  Limits based on 
human health are considered primary standards. Areas said to be in compliance with 
NAAQS are geographic areas where air quality meets the primary standard. (EPA)  
Hazardous Air Pollutant:  A substance or compound known or suspected to be a cancer 
causing agent, or to cause other series health effects such as birth defects or neurological 
disorders. 
 
Lowest Achievable Emission Rate (LAER) is the emissions requirement imposed on any 
new facility requiring a permit inside a non-attainment zone for NAAQS,  Generally, 
LAER is more stringent than BACT. 
 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) are the main ambient standards for 
the following six criteria pollutants: carbon monoxide (CO), lead (Pb), nitrogen oxides 
(NOx), sulfur oxides (SOx), ground-level ozone (O3), and particulate matter of 
aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to 10 micrometers (PM10) (Eastern Research 
Group). 
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Netting a practice wherein utilities are allowed to decommission equipment and install or 
upgrade equipment without triggering an NSR.  Unfortunately many of the oldest 
polluting plant used this loophole to install new equipment without adding any pollution 
control devises.  Thus they continued to emit pollution at far greater rates that those built 
under NSR standards. 
 
New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) are promulgated for criteria, hazardous, 
and other pollutant emissions from new, modified, or reconstructed sources that the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) determines contribute significantly to air 
pollution. These are typically emission standards, but may be expressed in other forms 
such as concentration and opacity. The NSPS are published in 40 Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) Part 60 (Eastern Research Group).   
 
NSR: New Source Review (The collective name for the Part D New Source Review and 
Prevention of Serious Deterioration programs.) (BEST) 
 
Open Meeting:  A scheduled board meeting that is held in an accessible location that is 
advertised to the public in advance to allow for their attendance.   
 
Part D NSR: This is the NSR program that applies to sources seeking permits in areas 
whose air quality violates the NAAQS.  (BEST) 
 
Point Sources are large, stationary, identifiable sources of emissions that release 
pollutants into the atmosphere. Sources are often defined by state or local air regulatory 
agencies as point sources when they annually emit more than a specified amount of a 
given pollutant, and how state and local agencies define point sources can vary. Point 
sources are typically large manufacturing or production plants. They typically include 
both confined “stack” emission points as well as individual unconfined “fugitive” 
emission sources (Eastern Research Group). 
 
Process Emissions are emissions from sources where an enclosure, collection system, 
ducting system, and/or stack (with or without an emission control device) is in place for a 
process. Process emissions represent emissions from process equipment (other than 
leaks) where the emissions can be captured and directed through a controlled or 
uncontrolled stack for release into the atmosphere (Eastern Research Group). 
 
Process Fugitive Emissions occur as leaks from process equipment including 
compressors, pump seals, valves, flanges, product sampling systems, pressure relief 
devices, and open-ended lines. Emissions from the process that are not caught by the 
capture system are also classified as process fugitive emissions (Eastern Research 
Group). 
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 Secondary Particulate Matter:  Secondary PM is particles that form through chemical 
reactions in the ambient air after dilution and condensation has occurred. Secondary PM 
is formed downwind of the source. Precursors of secondary PM include SO2, NOx, 
ammonia and VOC. (EPA)  
 
State Advisory Board:  A group of individuals that provide expertise for a specified 
purpose.  The board may be constituted by the legislature or by an executive order of the 
governor.  It shall not have regulatory powers, permitting powers or enforcement powers.   
 
State Policy Board:  A board authorized via state legislation to achieve defined aims, 
including but not limited to regulating specific functions as set forth in the authorizing 
legislation.  The policy board may be called a “commission” but the distinction between 
these entities and advisory boards is that they have regulatory functions authorized by the 
state legislature.  For the purposes of this analysis all entities with regulatory, permitting 
and enforcement powers will be called Policy Boards. 
Sulfur dioxide: or SO2, belongs to the family of sulfur oxide gases (SOx).  These gases 
dissolve easily in water.  Sulfur is prevalent in all raw materials, including crude oil, coal, 
and ore that contains common metals like aluminum, copper, zinc, lead, and iron.  SOx 
gases are formed when fuel containing sulfur, such as coal and oil, is burned, and when 
gasoline is extracted from oil, or metals are extracted from ore.  SO2 dissolves in water 
vapor to form acid, and interacts with other gases and particles in the air to form sulfates 
and other products that can be harmful to people and their environment.  
Over 65% of SO2 released to the air, or more than 13 million tons per year, comes from 
electric utilities, especially those that burn coal.  Other sources of SO2 are industrial 
facilities that derive their products from raw materials like metallic ore, coal, and crude 
oil, or that burn coal or oil to produce process heat.  Examples are petroleum refineries, 
cement manufacturing, and metal processing facilities. Also, locomotives, large ships, 
and some non-road diesel equipment currently burn high sulfur fuel and release SO2 
emissions to the air in large quantities. Source:  
(http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/so2/what1.html ) retrieved January 3, 2008 
Volatile Organic Compounds: Volatile organic compounds are compounds that have a 
high vapor pressure and low water solubility. Many VOCs are human-made chemicals 
that are used and produced in the manufacture of paints, pharmaceuticals, and 
refrigerants. VOCs typically are industrial solvents, such as trichloroethylene; fuel 
oxygenates, such as methyl tert-butyl ether (MTBE), or byproducts produced by 
chlorination in water treatment, such as chloroform. VOCs are often components of 
petroleum fuels, hydraulic fluids, paint thinners, and dry cleaning agents.(USGS)
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